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1. Introduction 
This concluding chapter draws together the findings of the preceding 
chapters. It deals with ten issues which have emerged as salient ones in 
different settings. Section 2 summarises regulatory proposals made for 
three spheres of governance (in international institutions, in public 
administration and in corporate governance). Section 3 deals with 
the recurring theme of motives (intentions) versus effects, and of 
processes versus results. Regulation of risk and appearances includes 
the criminal law concept of bribery as an offence of endangerment. 
Moreover, conflict of interest can have a (potentially obnoxious) effect 
on the actual decision only when leeway is granted to decision-makers. 
Private and public law conceptualise this issue by different techniques. 
Section 4 values independence and impartiality as guarantees of 
non-conflictedness of judges ( especially international judges), of arbi-
trators (especially in investor-state arbitration), and of members of 
international expert bodies. Public administrators are not indepen-
dent, but they must be impartial. Section 5 analyses conflict of interest 
in politics, while distinguishing the various types of office-holders: 
elected politicians, members of parliament, and heads of state. Section 
6 specifically investigates financial interests, with regard to bankers' 
compensation and management and board payments. Section 7 deals 
with the trade-off between unconflictedness and disinterestedness 
versus expertise and connectedness, which appears to be inevitable. 
The preceding chapters have demonstrated that it might be well worth 
tolerating conflict of interest in order to benefit from the conflicted 
* The author thanks Lukas Handschin and Daniel Högger for useful comments on a 
previous version of this chapter. 
357 
358 ANNE PETERS 
agents' expertise. Besides securing expertise, the exploitation of conflict 
of interest may engender further benefits (Section 8). For example, 
it might under specific conditions even contribute to institution-
building. Section 9 deals with conflict of interest i~ multi~level 
governance. Here the conflict between national and 1~te:nat10nal 
interests is a systemic problem. Section 10 explores the hm1ts of the 
law. The proliferation of conflict of interest regulation in all spheres of 
governance triggers the question whether conflict of interest is and 
should be a legal concern, or whether it should rather be treated as a 
matter of integrity and professionalism. The legalist approach might 
be futile or even counterproductive. However, any integrity culture 
needs a proper institutional frame, which can in turn be developed 
through the law itself. Section 11 concludes that there is convergence 
regarding both the problematique of conflict of interest ~nd :he.regu-
latory reactions, across all spheres of governance. The pnvat1sat10n of 
previously public tasks has proved to be a major conflict of interest-
generating factor, also in the international sphere. Simil_ar regulatory 
responses to conflict of interest have been pursued on d1ffer_ent le_vels 
of governance, and this is worth acknowledging and p_romotmg. F1:st, 
a common rationale for combating conflict of interest 1s the protect10n 
of trust. Secondly, command-and-control regulation and market-
based regulation must be mixed. Transparency requirements _make 
sense but also have their limits, in all spheres of governance. Fmally, 
pluralisation, instead of neutralisation, is a common and recomm~~d-
able strategy to manage conflict of interest. The costs ansmg 
from strictly banning conflict of interest are similar in all spheres of 
governance. Despite these similarities, regulatory responses mu.st 
of course remain diverse and tailored to the situation. In the end, m 
pluralist settings, notably with their extensions to the global level, 
conflict of interest regulation can be conceived as one procedural 
strategy to pursue the bonum commune. 
2. How to regulate conflict of interest? Concrete proposals 
in three spheres of governance 
Various chapters of the main parts of this book make suggestions for 
improving regulation of conflict of interest. Three chapters exe~pli~ the 
three spheres of governance: global, public and corporate. Theu findmgs 
are summarised in this section. 
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2.1 'Conflict of interest of international civil servants' ( Chapter 4) 
Auguste Nganga Malonga, in Chapter 4, asks the relatively novel ques-
tion whether not only officers of national public service, but also officials 
of international organisations need guidelines on conflict of interest. 
Nganga Malonga's starting point is that the difference between national 
public services and international public service is eroding. This in 
particular includes the closer relations with the private sector on both 
levels of governance which bears an emerging potential for new forms of 
conflict of interest. The conceptual background is global administrative 
law. Through that lens, international organisations are considered as 
genuine global public administrations. Therefore they are expected to 
make similar efforts to acquire (or restore) public confidence and to 
retain and gain legitimacy. 
Nganga Malonga gives a useful overview of staff regulations and rules 
of the most important international organisations, and mentions new 
important documents which address conflict of interest in international 
organisations, namely the report of the international civil service com-
mission of 2002 and the draft for a UN-system-wide Code of Ethics. 
However, uniform codes are problematic, because each of the organisa-
tions has its own mission, has a staff composed of various nationalities, 
and duty stations in many countries. 
Nganga Malonga enumerates and illustrates the typical conflict of 
interest constellations which require regulation. One issue is contracts 
and recruitment, where the promotion of relatives and favouritism 
occurs. A second issue is financial disclosure requirements. The open 
regulatory question is to whom this should apply - only to higher staff 
or to all? A third issue are external activities and relations with private 
sector and non-profit organisations (including teaching, publications, 
participation to advisory functions in scientific or governing boards). 
Fourthly, attempts from lobbyists to influence the work of international 
organisations are growing. For example, the World Health Organization 
is influenced by the pharmaceutical industry. 1 This constellation also 
calls for regulation. Further issues rising also for international organisa-
tions are post-employment and the protection of confidential informa-
tion acquired during office against later use. 
Besides the identification of the subject matter issues, the level of 
regulation needs to be determined. lt is an open question whether overall 
1 See in detail pp. 409-411. 
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soft standards on conflict of interest in international organisations have 
already emerged. Because conflicts are not per se improper, the organisa-
tions' disciplinary procedures seem not to be an appropriate response. 
Nganga Malonga suggests placing the emphasis on prevention. To his 
mind, standards of ethics or codes of conduct should contain the 
elements of ongoing risk analysis and awareness raising through training 
programmes with use of case studies. 
In conclusion, the emergence of the issue of conflict of interest in the 
international bureaucracies parallels and is indeed a natural consequence 
of the evolution of the role of international organisations on the world 
stage. Vigilance is required especially because of the relations to the 
private and the non-profit sector. And increased scrutiny is appropriate 
because of the use of public funds. Success of global governance requires 
public trust, and managing conflict of interest is one building block of 
generating and maintaining such trust. 
2.2 'Conflict of interest and the administration of public 
aff airs' ( Chapter 9) 
Benjamin Schindler uses examples from Swiss administrative law to 
make the conclusive argument that specific statements on the exact 
definition and methods of combating conflict of interest are possible 
only within the framework of a national legal system. As Jean-Bernard 
Auby,2 Schindler unmasks the image of an impartial administration 
devoting itself to the public good in complete independence of indivi-
dual interests and partisan disputes as a regulative ideal which can 
however never be attained in practice, because there is no a priori 
existing and clearly identifiable public good or interest. And it is no 
more possible to provide an ultimate definition of undesirable conflict of 
interest than it is to define the public interest. The modern adminis-
tration's task of assessing and weighing interests entails a political 
responsibility of the administration, which cannot be assumed by isola-
ting itself from outside influences. 
Governmental offices, agencies, commissions, services and organisa-
tions are beset by a broad and changing spectrum of conflict of interest 
all over the world. But whether these conflicts should be regarded as 
undesirable or not tends to depend on historical experience and on the 
2 Auby, 'Conflict of interest and administrative law', Chapter 8 in this volurne. 
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political environment. Moreover, the ways and methods to prevent these 
conflicts can vary from nation to nation when considering legal tradition 
and administrative culture. 
For example, the historically entrenched Swiss ( cantonal) style of admin-
istration is prone to conflict of interest, because it has traditionally 
eschewed a fully professionalised administration, and has instead relied 
on part-time administrators from the citizemy, as a means of democratic 
self government. Also, the very small scale of the administration in the 
cantons much increases the risk that personal or professional ties or 
animosities impact on administrative decisions. Thirdly, the Swiss adminis-
tration has been very open towards the private sector and runs many 
public-private ventures. But where the state regulates exactly the area in 
which it acts as an entrepreneur itself, a conflict of interest is inbuilt. 
Schindler discusses three legal instruments for managing conflict of 
interest in the administration: public sector employment law, adminis-
trative organisational law and administrative procedural law. Regarding 
administrative procedure, he suggests a strong functional separation in 
the very early administrative stages, and an emphasis on contradictory 
elements, following the model of the US Administrative Procedure 
Act, in order to further the truly comprehensive assessment and balan-
cing of interests. 
Despite finding that any approach to conflict of interest in the 
administration must inevitably be a local one, Schindler identifies a 
global 'minimal heart of good governance', namely that public officials 
must not exploit their office for personal ends. In addition, a tendency to 
global harmonisation of legal concepts relating to conflict of interest can 
be observed in two specific areas of administrative law. In public pro-
curement, an area particularly prone to corruption, favouritism, and 
nepotism, strict transparency and communication requirements have 
emerged worldwide, last but not least in the course of national imple-
mentation of the WTO General Procurement Agreement. 
In environmental law, a different strategy has been pursued. The aim 
here is not to suppress certain interests, but to strengthen the represen-
tation of the environmental interests which are in structural terms 
under-represented, for example through special rights of appeal for 
environmental NGOs. 
Schindler points out that criminal law is suited to tackle only the most 
extreme forms of conflict of interest in form of outright corruption. In 
order to address the most common and less severe forms, regulation should 
combine employment legislation, the law of administrative organisation 
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and administrative procedural law. Schindler concludes that a one-size-fits-
all solution for the whole area of public administration should be treated 
with considerable caution. Administrative structures, cultures and legal 
systems are far too divergent for such an approach. 
2.3 'Taking conflict of interest in corporate law seriously - direct 
and indirect rules addressing the agency problem' (Chapter 17) 
Rashid Bahar and Antoine Morand address conflict of interest in cor-
porate law which is a particular, egregious typ~ of_ a?en~y conflict. 
Corporate law is beset by agency conflicts because 1ts d1stmct1ve fea~ures 
( the pooling of assets of shareholders, who jointly control a busmess 
through transferable shares, and the delegation of management to spe-
cialised directors and managers, while shareholders enjoy the benefits 
of limited liability) require a principal to rely on a specialised but self-
interested agent. 
Obviously, the managers may be conflicted because they may not only 
have the interest of investors at heart. The controlling shareholders 
present the risk for minority shareholders that they will divert corporate 
profits for their own benefit. Thirdly, shareholders, directly ~r through the 
management they appoint, may use corporate assets to therr own benefit 
without considering the interests of other persons ( creditors and other 
stakeholders) who invested financial or human capital in the endeavour. 
From an agency perspective, the core purpose of corporate law is to 
minimise and hold in balance these three agency problems. Bahar and 
Morand use the example of Swiss corporate law, with comparative 
references to other jurisdictions, to test this proposition. They first 
survey those few rules which explicitly aim to contain conflict of interest, 
notably the directors' and officers' duty of loyalty and equal treatment of 
shareholders (which might be considered as the 'positive component' 
of conflict of interest). The authors then identify other legal provisions, 
notably in the Swiss Code of Obligations, which relate to issues such as 
structures of a stock company, shareholder rights and liability, and 
which might implicitly or indirectly also result in limiting conflicts _of 
interest. Bahar's and Morand's main conclusion is that, while Sw1ss 
corporate law hardly explicitly addresses conflict of interest, the bu~ of 
the statute law indirectly addresses the issue. Still the current legal reg1me 
seems to dissatisfy the 'users' of corporate law, as the low ranking Swiss 
corporate governance in the 'Doing business' studies of the World Bank 
shows. The existing rules are not weil calibrated, they are in some 
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respects over-inclusive, in others under-inclusive for addressing conflict 
of interest. Bahar and Morand therefore suggest that the law reformer 
should address systematically the various types of conflict of interest and 
subject them to the same set of rules. They suggest to avoid outright 
banning of simultaneous jobs and not to prescribe incompatibilities by 
law, in order to preserve the benefit of specialisation and expertise which 
results from the reliance on agents. Instead, the law should introduce 
procedural mechanisms such as disclosure, voting rights, and trustees to 
monitor compliance. These mechanisms should allow shareholders and 
creditors to react through voice and rights. Procedural mechanisms, as 
opposed to substantive standards, constitute a legislative framework in 
which the corporation can operate freely without being stifled by the 
legislator which is not equipped to decide in an abstract fashion what is 
good for companies. Procedural rules have the further advantage that 
courts are well equipped to apply them without having to enter into 
substantive business decisions when scrutinising a conflicted situation. 
3. Regulatory approaches to motives, appreciation and process 
An important theme which recurred throughout the chapters of this 
volume is that of motives (intentions) versus effects, of processes versus 
results. Crucially, the concept of conflict of interest relates to intra-
personal conflicts. The 'conflictedness' is a state of the mind of a person 
who is empowered to take decisions on behalf of others. That state of 
mind can only be inferred from external indicators. It can hardly be 
verified from the outside whether a decision-maker has in fact been 
conflicted, whether that conflict had a decisive impact on the decision-
making process, and whether it was a causal factor for the resulting 
decision. Therefore, regulators all over the world seeking to manage 
conflict of interest must pay attention to decision-making motives and 
processes rather than to the outcomes. 
In that context, a kind of cross-over evolution has been diagnosed. 
While the approach to 'conflict' has become more objective (focusing 
on appearances, and not on what actually happened, but what 
might happen), and thus implied a move towards prophylactic laws, 
the approach to 'interest' has become more subjective, covering no 
longer merely pecuniary, but all kinds of interests. 3 Appearances and 
3 Stark, Conflict of Interest in American Public Life, passim, esp. pp. 4-5. 
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presumptions play a part both in the public sphere and to the profes-
sional sphere, as two chapters in this book illustrate.
4 
3.1 'Conflict of interest and administrative law' (Chapter 8) 
Jean-Bernard Auby, in Chapter 8, asks whether the logics of adminis-
trative law are well in accordance with those which are the rationale for 
avoiding conflicts of interest in public apparatuses. The analysis is based 
on a broad concept of conflict of interest which includes conflicts 
between different public interests. 
Auby points out that administrative law, more than other areas of law, 
needs to address conflict of interest, but at the same time has 
more difficulties in dealing with the issue. The need stems from the 
inevitability of administrative discretion. The more discretion, the more 
important becomes regulation ( or at least taking cognisance and estab-
lishing principles) on conflict of interest. But the difficulties arise from 
the convergence of private and public interests, and from the impossi-
bility of 'neutrality' in balancing conflicting public interests. 
Auby concludes that once it is admitted that administrators are prone 
to conflict of interest and that this is a problem which must be tackled, 
the consequence is that not only administrative rules but our entire 
understanding of administrative law requires modification. Notably, 
there is a need to reconsider what 'the' public interest and public 
interests are in legal terms. lt might be added that this question poses 
itself also on the level of global governance.5 For example, is there really 
an 'interest of the European Union', as Article 17 of the Treaty on the 
European Union (TEU) presupposes, and who defines it and how?
6 
3.2 Regulation of risk and appearances 
The concept of conflict of interest does not refer to actual wrongdoing, 
but only to the potential to engage in wrongdoing. lt describes a 
situation, not an action. An office-holder or professional does not 
4 Besides Auby's chapter also Davis, 'Empirical research on conflict of interest: a critical 
look', Chapter 3 in this volume. 
5 See Peter, Public Interest and Common Good. 
6 Art. 17(1): 'l. The Commission shall promote the general interest ofthe Union and take 
appropriate initiatives to that end: Treaty on European Union (TEU) of 13 December 
2007 (OJ 2008 C 115/13). 
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'commit' a conflict of interest, he may find himself in a situation.7 The 
?rese~ce of a conflict of interest needs 'no wrong result, not even an 
mtent10n to do wrong - only the violation of our sense of "the rules of 
[fair] play"'. 8 'The issue is one of fair play and, as such, is more a matter 
of conscience ... than of consequences.'9 
The questio~ is whether the rules of fair play should be enforced by 
law. In any reg1me under the rule of law, regulation which curtails the 
liberty of those subjected to it must not be disproportionate. 10 This 
means that regulation on conflict of interest should be as unobtrusive as 
possible,. and s~ould intervene only where this is necessary. Regulation 
on confhct of mterest could easily be justified if it were clear that a 
conflicted state of the mind always led to wrong decisions. However, 
there is agreement that focusing on wrong decisions would not suffice to 
combat the har~. Regulators seek to ban conflict of interest already on 
the g~ound that 1t bears the particular risk of wrong decisions, even if 
that nsk does not materialise. The argument is that conflict of interest is 
a (moral) harm in itself, because 'it renders one's judgement less reliable 
than normal. Conflict of interest creates an unusual risk of error.' 11 From 
~ legal perspective, 'the best argument for laws disallowing conflicts of 
mterest probably lies within the threat of a general disorder that would 
arise only "if everybody did it'". 12 
But why would focusing only on actually wrong outcomes not be suffi-
cient? ~irst of al~ _this would require an examination of causality and 
alternative causal1t1es, which is unfeasible. If an effective influence of the 
interest on the decision (i.e. a causality of the interest for the outcome) were 
required, this would, for example, not be the case if the decision was taken 
by a _body by_ unanimit~, ~nd whe? the conflicted member did not play a 
cruc1al part m the dec1s1on-making process, especially if he was not a 
rapporteur or chairman. 13 In those cases, conflict of interest would have 
to go unsanctioned. More importantly, the mere risk of a wrong outcome in 
7 Spec~, 'Co~flict of_ Intere~t', p. 67: See also Davis, 'Conflict of Interest', p. 592: 'Having 
confhct of mterest rs not hke stealmg money or taking a bribe. One can have a conflict of 
interest without doing anything wrang.' 
10
8 Margolis, 'Confl_ ict o_f Interest and Conflicting Interests', p. 364. 9 Ib'd 365 l ., p. . 
11 
See on proport10nality concerns Hine, 'Conclusion', pp. 214-215. 
Davis, 'Conflict of Interest', p. 589. 
:: Mar_golis: 'Conflicting Interests and Conflicting Interests', p. 364. 
See m thrs sense Commission de reflexion pour la prevention des conflits d'interets dans 
la_vie publique, Pour une nouvelle deontologie de la vie publique (26 January 2011), p. 47 
w1th reference to French administrative law. 
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itself undermines trust. Trust is a good deemed worthy of protection in all 
three spheres of govemance, as will be shown in detail below at pp. 411--413. 
Besides banning conflicts which in themselves constitute only a risk of 
a wrong decision, regulators go even further and tackle not only the 
conflict but already the appearance of conflict. The reason why appear-
ances count again lies in the fact that the 'conflict' is a state of the mind. 
This means that real conflictedness or non-conflictedness can hardly be 
measured. Therefore, both public law and corporate law treat appear-
c . 1 fl' 14 ances of a conflict on the same 1ootmg as actua con 1cts. 
To conclude, in all spheres of governance, regulators address conflicted-
ness as such (independent of its impact on decisions). The justification is 
that independently of whether the decisions taken by a (potentially) 
conflicted fiduciary is in fact not in the principals' best interest, it is apt 
to undermine the confidence of the principals ( clients or the general 
public). And because of the preoccupation with trust and confidence, 
additionally even the mere appearance of a conflict of interest is tackled by 
regulators on all levels of governance, and with all types of regulatory 
instruments, including professional self-regulation. If the risk has materi-
alised, and the decision taken by a conflicted decision-maker was indeed 
wrong ( assuming that this can be precisely determined, which is not 
always the case), this constitutes an additional harm. 
3.3 Corporate and administrative law: business judgement 
rule and discretion 
In the modern constitutional state, public bodies may not act without a 
legal basis. And given the overall state of regulation, professionals do not 
act free of legal constraints either. Do, as a general matter, these legal 
constraints effectively neutralise any potentially obnoxious effect of 
possible conflict of interest? Indeed, only if a decision-maker has a 
leeway, a conflict of interest can have an effect on the actual decision. 
If the decision-maker does not have any manoeuvring space, his con-
flictedness would and could not make a difference to the result. 
lt might be argued that, due to the inherent indeterminacy of legal 
norms, no legal rule can strictly predetermine the outcomes of its 
14 See for public governance Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), Managing Conflict of Interest, p. 13; for corporate governance Thev~no~ and 
Bahar, Conflict of Interest, p. 21 on the legal presumption that the duty of loyahty 1s not 
complied with in specific situations. 
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application. There is never only one 'right decision', neither for the judge 
nor for the administrator, nor for the law-abiding professional. 15 Law-
interpreters and appliers always have some leeway. This means that even 
in a strictly regulated context, the decision-maker's conflict of interest has 
the potential to influence his or her way of applying the legal rules to the 
facts at hand. 
Moreover, in all spheres of governance, the law has acknowledged an 
additional manoeuvring space through specific legal techniques. For 
example, the interplay between national regulation and European judi-
cial scrutiny is governed by the European Court of Human Rights 
concept of a 'margin of appreciation', conceptualising the leeway domes-
tic authorities enjoy when applying the standards of the European 
Convention of Human Rights. 
In the corporate sphere, the 'business judgement rule' is acknowledged. 
Given the fact that economic decision-makers typically face a variety of 
economically sound options, entrepreneurial decisions taken, for 
example by members of the board of directors of a company, are not 
scrutinised strictly by courts. For example, in a limited liability company 
(societe a responsabilite limitee), the directors will not incur liability for 
any business decisions lying within that margin of appreciation. How-
ever, the business judgement rule (i.e. the rule of non-liability) does not 
apply to decisions influenced by special or extraneous interests. 16 
In the sphere of public governance, a functional equivalent is the 
concept of 'official discretion' as espoused by the administrative law of 
many national legal orders. 17 Idealtypically, the exercise of discretion 
can be distinguished from applying the law. Exercising discretion is a 
volitional act, a choice among a number of possible options for action. 
In contrast, the application of the law is (idealtypically) a cognitive act. 
Seen through the lern; of the concept of discretion, conflict of interest is 
closely related to abuse of discretion, best known in its French inception 
of 'detournement de pouvoir'. 18 The French term is frequently used in some 
15 Cf. in favour of the 'one right answer' Dworkin, 'Can Rights Be Controversial?'. See also 
Dworkin, 'Is there Really No Right Answer in Hard Cases?'. Against Dworkin see 
Woozley, 'No Right Answer'. 
16 See for German corporate law Schneider, 'Commentary on § 52', para. 482, pp. 
3154-3155. 
17 Galligan, Discretionary Powers; Schindler, Verwaltungsermessen. 
18 See., e.g. Waline, Droit administratif, pp. 606-608. This textbook defines the standard 
case of detournement de pouvoir as 'la poursuite par l' auteur d'un acte d'un but etranger a 
l'interet general' (p. 606). 
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systems of national administrative law to describe irregularity of motive 
or purpose in connection with the exercise of discretion. Detournement de 
pouvoir occurs when discretionary powers are exercised for purposes 
other than those for which such powers have been granted, or are not 
exercised for the objectives underlying the conferral of these powers. 
Although some common law systems such as the US do not have an 
equivalent of this concept, British administrative law recognises 
'improper purpose', and 'taking irrelevant considerations into account' 
as common law grounds for the control of administrative discretion.
19 
Abuse of discretion is therefore a principle common to various jurisdic-
tions and constitutes a general principle oflaw in the sense of Article 38( 1) ( c) 
of the ICJ Statute.20 This means that international bodies often enjoy 
discretion in an administrative law sense, and they might also abuse it.
21 
Abuse of discretion matters because it constitutes a ground for judicial 
review. Courts are empowered to scrutinise whether discretion was 
abused, and may possibly vacate an administrative decision flawed by 
abuse. The interesting point is that within this framework of adminis-
trative law, the illegality stems not from the wrong results, but relates to 
the process of decision-making. 22 Judicial control is - in this context - a 
control of reasons, not a control of the (formally correct) result. 
And this is the link to conflict of interest. Conflict of interest means 
that an 'alien' interest was present - independently of whether this really 
changed the decision. In the field of administrative discretion, this is apt 
to constitute abuse of discretion. Of course the administrator's inner 
motive can never be scrutinised by a court, but can only be inferred from 
the official reasons given for a decision by the individual or collective 
decision-maker. The reasoning should reveal whether undue interests 
have impacted on the decision or not. 
3.4 The criminal law concept: offences of endangerment 
Addressing a risky situation with the tool of criminal law has led to the 
conceptualisation of offences of endangerment. The criminal offence of 
bribery has been conceptualised as being independent of the actual 
19 See, e.g. Barnett, Constitutional & Administrative Law, pp. 734-738. 
20 Amerasinghe, The Law of the International Civil Service, p. 278. 
21 Cahin, 'La notion de pouvoir discretionnaire appliquee aux organisations 
internationales'. 
22 See Alexy, 'Ermessensfehler', pp. 707-708. 
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outcome of a tainted decision-making process. Within the UNCAC 
framework, the intention of the briber of public officials is exactly to 
elicit official action within the mandate or competence of the official: 
'in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or 
her official duties' (Article 15 UNCAC (emphasis added)). The OECD 
Convention of 1997 relates to acts of officials 'in relation to the perform-
ance of official duties'. The Convention leaves it to the state parties to 
criminalise as bribery all forms of corrupting influence upon (foreign) 
public officials, whether the 'consideration' for the bribe is the breach of 
d ' h " C 23 utres or t err correct per1ormance. OECD state parties must ensure 
that discretionary decisions are, as such, covered by their domestic law 
definition of bribery. Conduct within official discretion, but influenced 
by improper motives, must be covered as well. Such action must be per 
se considered as being contrary to the official's duty to act impartially, 
even if the resulting decision seems formally correct.24 This means that 
bribery can occur also with regard to the exercise of an official's discre-
tion, even when its result, the decision, ultimately stays within the realm 
of discretion. The authors of the OECD Convention were convinced that 
an advantage offered to a public official is bound to influence how he 
uses his discretion. The person offering the advantage is speculating on 
the abuse of discretion for a corrupt purpose, and should be punished. 
This is the case even though, objectively speaking, the official's decision 
may seem to be perfectly justifiable and reasonable. The reason for the 
criminalisation of active bribery even in this constellation is that courts 
cannot revisit the issue in order to determine whether the official might 
have decided differently had the advantage not been offered.25 
The concept of discretion has, in the context of bribery, even been 
transferred to the private realm. With regard to bribery among private 
persons, Article 4a of the Swiss Unfair Competition Law, for example, 
states that the resulting action of the bribed employee, associate, man-
dated person or auxiliary of a private sector entity must be either 
contrary to his duties or 'depending on his power of appreciation [soit 
contraire a ses devoirs ou depende de son pouvoir d' appreciation] '. 
23 Zerbes, 'Commentary on Article l', pp. 137-138. 
24 Official Commentary No. 3 to the OECD Convention on bribery, reprinted in Mark 
Pieth, Lucinda A. Low and Peter J Cullen (eds.), The OECD Convention on Bribery, 
p. xxx. See for this principle in Swiss law (§ 332ter Swiss criminal code) Pieth, 'Korrup-
tion', paras. 41-42. 
25 Zerbes, 'Commentary on Article l', pp. 138-139. 
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The criminal offence can be committed wherever there is 'discretion' in 
this private law sense, independent of an illegal result, and even inde-
pendent of any abuse of discretion. To conclude, both the administrative 
law approaches to conflict of interest, and the criminal law approach to 
bribery26 focus on risks and processes, as opposed to outcomes. 
3.5 Irrelevance of bad intentions and distinction of'bias' and 'partiality' 
Conflictedness in the person of a decision-maker is in part conscious, 
and in part not. One cannot have an interest without knowing it. But 
one can easily misjudge how much it might affect one's judgement. 
Indeed, psychological research clearly demonstrates that people with a 
conflict of interest often esteem too highly their own reliability.
27 
Per-
sons 'are prone to having optimistic biases regarding themselves, includ-
ing judgments about whether their own behavior is objective.'
28 
This bias in 
assessing oneself, including the erroneous assumption of one's own 
capacity to decide in an impartial manner, is often unconscious and 
unintentional, and largely under-appreciated. So rather than committing 
any intentional violation of ethical or legal rules, decision-makers 
affected by conflict of interest are, as psychological research shows, in 
' . . f h ,29 strateg1c 1gnorance o arm. 
In this context, conflictedness must be distinguished from bias. Con-
flictedness is not bias but a tendency toward bias. Bias has been defined 
as an 'aggregate drift of judgment in one direction'. 30 Tobe biased means 
to be unconsciously one-sided ( as opposed to neutral). Bias does not 
necessarily involve interests. For instance, a hardcore natural scientist 
can be biased in his research against finding supernatural phenomena. 
Bias is always unconscious. Taking this into account, Michael Davis' 
methodological Chapter 3 in this volume, 'Empirical research on conflict 
of interest: a critical look', focuses on (psychological) research on conflict 
of interest. Davis suggests the following (psychological) research pro-
gramme. First, bias should be abandoned as the stand-in for conflict of 
26 See on the relationship between conflict of interest and bribery Peters, 'Conflict of interest as 
a cross-cutting problem of govemance', Chapter 1 in this volume, pp. 30--33. 
27 Davis, 'Conflict of Interest', p. 591; Moore et al., 'Introduction', p. 3. 
28 Dana, 'How Psychological Research Can Inform Policies for Dealing with Conflicts of 
Interest in Medicine', p. 371 (emphasis added). 
29 Dana, 'Conflicts of Interest and Strategie Ignorance of Harm', p. 206. 
30 Davis, 'Empirical research', Chapter 3 in this volume, relying on Dana, 'How Psychological 
Research Can Inform Policies for Dealing with Conflicts of Interest in Medicine'. 
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interest. The study of perception may be a more fruitful way. Secondly, it 
should be investigated whether conflict of interest can be unconscious. 
Thirdly, researchers should try to measure reliability of judgement, 
not just bias. 
The element of unconsciousness of the actors beset by a conflict of 
interest is important, because this should guide the strategies to combat 
conflict of interest. The conclusion to draw for the functionality and 
effectiveness of transparency and disclosure requirements is that these 
are insufficient to reach the objective of unconflicted decision-making. 
Disclosures will not eliminate the extent to which the decision-maker let 
him or herself be influenced by the undue interest, an extent that he or 
she normally underestimates. The suitable measure would therefore be 
'creating disincentives for ignorance of harm'.31 
4. Independence and impartiality as guarantees 
of non-conflictedness 
Reducing the occurrence for the likelihood of conflict of interest is 
central to the fair administration of justice. The classical twin require-
ments of independence and impartiality of judges and arbitrators serve 
this goal. Independence is a traditional mechanism to prevent conflict of 
interest arising from dependency on others and the resulting tendency to 
favour their interests. In this book, two chapters examine the independ-
ence and impartiality of ICSID arbitrators (Chapter 6), and of expert 
members of international human rights bodies ( Chapter 7). The 
groundwork for this, the principles of independence and impartiality 
of national and international judges and arbitrators in general, both in 
national and in global governance, will briefly be recapitulated here 
(pp. 371-380). Outside of the adjudicative ( dispute-resolving) function, 
the principle of the impartiality of the administration contains a similar 
guarantee of non-conflictedness (pp. 382-383). 
4.1 The impartiality and independence of the judiciary 
No other chapter of this book deals with conflict of interest in the 
judicial branch; this will therefore be addressed in this section. With 
regard to the judiciary, the issue is normally phrased in different terms, 
31 Dana, 'Conflicts of Interest and Strategie Ignorance of Harrn', p. 218. 
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namely in terms of independence and impartiality. Especially 'impartial-
ity' is to some extent equivalent to the absence of a conflict of interest 
(although, inversely, partiality does not always result in a conflict 
of interest). 32 
Independence and impartiality are not only legal requirements for 
judges in probably all modern legal systems,33 but are qualities which 
characterise the judicial office and define a court in the modern sense. 
Often, the principles of impartiality and independence are enshrined in 
constitutional texts. They are likewise prescribed by international law 
(Article 14 ICCPR and Article 6 ECHR). 
The concepts of independence and impartiality overlap, and are 
usually not clearly distinguished. The notion of independence refers 
primarily to the lack of any connection between the tribunal and other 
government institutions, especially the executive branch. Impartiality 
must exist in relation to the parties to the suit and the case at issue. 
As far as judicial impartiality is concerned, the ECHR has seminally 
distinguished between a subjective and an objective approach to ascer-
taining judicial impartiality. In the words of the ECHR: 
Whilst impartiality normally denotes the absence of prejudice or bias, its 
existence or otherwise can ... be tested in various ways. A distinction can 
in this context be drawn between a subjective approach, that is endeav-
ouring to ascertain the personal conviction of a given judge in a given 
case, and an objective approach, that is determining whether he offered 
guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect.
34 
32 Conscious partiality is part of the job in many settings, and does not as such pose any 
conflict of interest problem. For example, Amnesty International (AI) could be said to be 
'partial' towards human rights, and rather hostile towards the countervailing raison d' etat. 
However, this is not any hidden agenda of AI, but exactly the institutional role of this NGO. 
So neither any 'undue' interest nor a role conflict is present. See on the links between 
impartiality and conflict of interests, and on the impossibility of a complete disinterested-
ness ofthe judiciary Emmanuelle Jouannet, 'Remarques conclusives', pp. 295-298. 
33 See as random examples for German Courts: §§ 41-49 of the law on civil procedure 
(ZPO); § 54 of the law on the administrative tribunal procedure ( Verwaltungsgerichts-
ordnung); §§ 22 and 24 of the law on criminal procedure (StPO); for the German 
Constitutional Court § 19 Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz; for the US 28 USC § 455: 
Disqualification of justice, judge, or magistrate judge: '(a) Any justice, judge, or magis-
trate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.' 
34 ECHR, Piersack v. Belgien, appl. no. 8692/79, 1 October 1982, Ser. A 53 (1982), para. 30. 
See more recently ECHR (Grand Chamber), Kyprianou v. Greece, appl. no. 73797/01, 
15 December 2005, para. 118. 
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This two-pronged test has been widely adopted in judicial and arbitral 
practice, both with regard to judges sitting in domestic courts and for 
international courts and tribunals. 35 
Under the subjective approach, the judge's impartiality will be pre-
sumed unless there is evidence to the contrary. 36 There are few - if any -
cases where impartiality has been established under the 'subjective' test, 
since in practice such evidence can be very hard to come by. 
The objective test refers to structural issues. The question here is 
whether the way in which the court is composed and organised, or a 
certain succession of functions or one or more of its members, may give 
rise to doubts as to the impartiality of the court or judge. Under the 
objective test, it is crucial that not only actual partiality must be avoided, 
but already any appearance of partiality. The court here follows the English 
dictum that 'justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and 
undoubtedly be seen to be done'. 37 In the worldwide case law regarding 
judicial impartiality, similar criteria have been applied to establish the 
(apparent) lack of impartiality. Courts use concepts such as 'legitimate 
fear' ofbias, 'objectively justified fear', or a 'real <langer of bias', looked at 
through the eyes of a reasonable man, or ask whether the circumstances 
'lead a reasonable observer, properly informed, to reasonably apprehend 
bias'. 38 The rather rare incidence of a successful challenge of a higher 
judge occurred in the Pinochet affair before the British House of Lords. 
The former Chilean head of state Augusto Pinochet was accused of 
crimes against humanity. During the extradition procedure he chal-
lenged Law Lord Hoffmann who was involved in an organisation affili-
ated to Amnesty International (AI), with AI appearing as a party to the 
case. The House of Lords characterised this constellation as one where 
Lord Hoffmann was a judge in his own (ideational) cause. The fact that 
the interest involved was non-pecuniary did not hinder the application 
of the automatic disqualification rule.39 
35 See for the ICTY, Prosecutor v. Furundzija (IT-95-17/1-A), Appeals judgment of 21 July 
2000, para. 181. 
36 See only ECHR, Kyprianou (note 34), para. 119; ICTY, Furundzjia (note 35), para. 196. 
37 Lord Hewart CJ, The King v. Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy, judgment of 9 November 
1923, 1 King's Bench Division, 256-260, at 259. 
38 The latter phrase is used by ICTY, Furundzjia (note 35), para. 208. 
39 House of Lords, R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrates, ex parte Pinochet 
(No. 2) [1999] UKHL l; [2000] 1 AC 119, 15 January 1999. See on this case Davala, 
'Conflict of interest in universal human rights bodies', Chapter 7 in this volume. 
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The safeguarding of judicial independence and impartiality in national 
courts has long been an issue of international policy. On the global level, the 
United Nations have adopted 'Basic Principles on the Independence of the 
Judiciary', which, however, mention impartiality only under the heading of 
the freedom of expression and association of judges.
40 
In Europe, the 
Council of Europe has adopted a recommendation 'The independence, 
efficiency and role of judges',41 and a 'European Charter on the Statute for 
Judges'.42 It has also established a Consultative Council of European Judges 
( CCJE) as an advisory body. 43 This body produces, to the attention of the 
Committee of Ministers, opinions related to independence, impartiality 
(including conflict of interest) and competence of judges.
44 
Judges worldwide have also engaged in self-regulation of judicial con-
duct. A group of justices from Asia and Africa elaborated the 'Bangalore 
Principles on Judicial Conduct', on the basis of a review of a large number of 
ethical codes for judiciaries.45 The principles were adopted in 2002 and set 
up six fundamental 'values'. The first ones are independence and impartial-
ity. The Principles state that '[j]udicial independence is a pre-requisite 
to the rule of law and a fundamental guarantee of a fair trial', and that 
' [ i] mpartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office'. 
With respect to judicial ethics, including the avoidance of conflict of 
interest, a shift can be observed from relying on more informal checks 
towards a more active approach.46 This approach includes, for example, 
the adoption of codes of conducts for judges, and the establishment of 
'councils for the judiciary', as recently happened in various European 
countries, whose task is to safeguard and further judicial ethics. Jonathan 
Soeharno names four reasons for the growing attention to judicial 
40 Para. 8, Principles endorsed by the General Assembly Resolutions 40/32 of 29 November 
1985 and 40/146 of 13 December 1985. 
41 Committee of Ministers, Recommendation R(94) 12 of 13 October 1994. 
42 (DAJ/DOC 898) 23) of 8-10 July 1998. 
43 See www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/ccje/default_en.asp (last accessed 15 December 
2011). 
44 See, e.g. Opinion No. 3 of the Consultative Council of European Judges ( CCJE) to the 
attention of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on the principles and 
rules governing judges' professional conduct, in particular ethics, incompatible behav-
iour and impartiality, of 19 November 2002. This opinion extensively deals with impar-
tiality and with conflict of interest (paras. 20-40). 
45 'Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct', elaborated by a judicial group on 
strengthening judicial integrity, and adopted by a Round Table Meeting of Chief Justices 
held at the Peace Palace in The Hague, of 25-26 November 2002. The codes and 
instruments on which the Bangalore Principles draw are listed in the annex. 
46 Soeharno, The Integrity of the Judge, p. 13. 
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integrity, which includes attention to conflict of interest ansmg for 
judges. These are the growing power of the judiciary, with respect to 
the complexification of societies with the ensuing growth of occasions 
for conflicts, more media attention, the upsurge of individualism and 
the decrease of moral homogeneity.47 
In the end, judges should not be isolated from the society in which they 
live, and should concomitantly not be completely disinterested (which is 
anyway illusionary). A reasonable balance therefore needs to be struck 
between the degree to which judges may be involved in society and the 
need for them tobe and to be seen as independent and impartial.48 
4.2 The impartiality and independence of the international judge 
The standards of independence and impartiality apply to international 
judges as well.49 They are codified for the International Court of Just-
ice,50 for the Human Rights Courts,51 for the International Criminal 
Court,52 for the ad hoc criminal tribunals,53 and for basically every other 
international court. 
47 Ibid., pp. 16-19. 48 CCJE, Opinion No. 3 (note 44), para. 28. 
49 See on this issue in scholarship Ruiz Fabri and Sore! (eds.), Independance et impartialite 
des juges internationaux; International Law Institute (institut de droit international), 
session de Rhode, 6th commission, 'La situation du juge international' ( travaux prepa-
ratoires and projet de resolution), rapporteur: Gilbert Guillaume, Yearbook of the Institute 
of International Law 74 (2011) (Paris: Pedone). 
50 Arts. 2 and 20 ICJ Statute. 
51 See, e.g. Art. 21(3) ECHR; Art. 19 ofthe Statute ofthe Inter-American Court ofHuman 
Rights of 1 October 1979 (Resolution No. 448): 'l. Judges may not take part in matters in 
which, in the opinion of the Court, they or members of their family have a direct interest 
or in which they have previously taken part as agents, counsel or advocates, or as 
members of a national or international court or an investigatory committee, or in any 
other capacity' (emphasis added). See in scholarship Flauss, 'Libres propos sur l'inde-
pendance des juges it la Cour europeenne des droits de l'homme'. 
52 Art. 36(3)(a), Art. 40, Art. 41(2)(a) ICC Statute (Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court of 17 July 1998, ILM 37 (1998), 1002). See with regard to the prosecutor 
whose role is that of an impartial representative of the global public interest Art. 42(7) 
ICC Statute; and finally the ICC Staff Regulations, adopted by the Assembly of States 
Parties, New York, 8-12 September 2003 (Doc. ICC-ASP/2/10): Conflict of interest, (m): 
'Staff members shall not be actively associated with the management of, or hold a 
financial interest in, any profit-making business or other concern, if it is possible for 
the staff member or the profit-making business or other concern to benefit from such 
association or financial interest by reason of his or her position with the Court.' 
53 Art. 13 of the Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (Security Council Res. 1877 of 7 July 2009), mentioning only 'impartiality' as 
a personal quality ofthe judges. See also Rules of Procedure and Evidence, IT/32/Rev. 45, 
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As on the domestic plane, the institutional independence of an inter-
national judge depends on his or her country's adherence to the rule of 
law. There is no reason to believe that judges appointed by dictatorships 
to international courts and tribunals enjoy more independence than 
those appointed to the domestic courts by those governments. 54 This 
means that the members of an international court, which is composed 
by the nationals of diverse countries, may enjoy very different degrees of 
independence from their governments. Admittedly, 'personal' independ-
ence may be a different matter. lt has been asserted that the opinions of 
international judges from the former socialist block have not coincided 
more frequently with their governments' officially proclaimed positions 
55 b h' . h than those of judges from Western states, ut t 1s assert10n as not 
been statistically corroborated. lt is clear that the institution of judicial 
independence must be embedded - on the multiple levels of governance 
- in a political system and legal culture in which this independence is not 
only formally guaranteed but also respected in fact. 
In international courts, there is an additional specific threat to the 
impartiality of judges, namely the <langer that the judge on an inter-
national court who decides on legal disputes involving his or her country 
of nationality, is beset by a conflict of interest between the interest of the 
international community, which mandates that he or she decide the 
dispute in full independence and impartiality, and the national interest 
of his or her home country.56 
8 December 2010, Rule 15: Disqualification ofJudges (adopted 11 February 1994, last 
amended 17 November 1999): '(A) A Judge may not sit on a trial or appeal in any case in 
which the Judge has a personal interest or conceming which the Judge has or has had any 
association which might affect his or her impartiality. The Judge shall in any such 
circumstance withdraw, and the President shall assign another Judge to the case: See 
as two examples of challenges of judges in international criminal proceedings: ICTY, 
Furundzija (note 35), fourth ground of appeal, paras. 164-215 relying on the ECHR case 
law on the standards for an 'impartial' tribunal, and on legal comparison. Special Court 
for Sierra Leone, Appeals Chamber, Decision on Defence Motion Seeking the Disqualifi-
cation of Justice Robertson from the Appeals Chamber (13 March 2004), Prosecutor v. 
Sesay (case no. SCSL-2004-AR15-15). 
54 Szurek, 'La composition des jurisdictions internationales permanents', p. 54. Historically, in 
the era before 1989, the independence ofthose judges who were nationals ofauthoritarian or 
totalitarian countries, notably of communist countries, has often been called into question. 
55 Lachs, 'A Few Thoughts on the Independence of Judges of the International Court of 
Justice', pp. 596-597. Manfred Lachs was a member of the ICJ and anational of Poland in 
the communist period. 
56 International courts and tribunals are always put together under due consideratio'n of 
regional groups. The ECJ and the ECHR are composed of a number of judges equal to the 
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The institutional design of international courts does not naively assume 
that, because it is the essence of the judicial office to be independent, the 
nationality of the judges would play no role whatsoever. Although the 
aspiration is to 'super-nationalise' the judges on international courts57 -
i.e. to strip them off all national interests - it is understood that this is no 
more than a regulative idea. On the other hand, the institutional design of 
international courts does not imply 'that the judges would act as a kind of 
defence lawyers for their country for the protection of a presumed national 
interest: 
58 
Rather, designers reckon with some national bias or appearance 
of bias of the judges, and pursue a pragmatic strategy for managing this 
perennial conflict of interest. That pragmatic strategy is to 'neutralise' the 
assumed national bias in the person of the individual judges through the 
assumed national biases of his or her colleagues. Then, an important 
exception to the usual general norms on judicial impartiality is that the 
national judge need not recuse him or herself in a case involving his or her 
own country.
59 
He is allowed to participate in the deliberations and to vote. 
This is a deviation from the principle that no one should be a judge in his 
own cause (assuming that the judge's country's cause is, because of the 
bond of nationality, inevitably also his or her cause). The reason for this 
allowance is that recusal would hamper the geographic representation of 
various legal cultures.
60 
The ( expected) bias of the bench will be neutralised 
by 'the other partys' judge. 
number of member states to the respective organisation, so that a member state of the 
regime will have its 'own' judge (See Art. 19(2) TEU: 'The Court ofJustice shall consist of 
one judge from each Member State. It shall be assisted by Advocates-General. The General 
Court shall include at least one judge per Member State.' Art. 20 ECHR: 'The Court shall 
consist of a number of judges equal to that of the High Contracting Parties.'). See on the 
independence of the international judge and possible conflicts of interest due to his 
nationality Manouvel, Les opinions separees a la Cour internationale, pp. 197-203; Szurek, 
'La composition des jurisdictions internationales permanents', pp. 65-70. 
57 
de Lapradelle, Statement, in Permanent Court of International Justice, Advisory Com-
mittee of Jurists, Proces-Verbaux of the Proceedings of the Committee (16 June-24 July 
1920) (Clark, New Jersey: The Lawbook Exchange Ltd., 2006), p. 534. 
58 
Christian Tomuschat rightly points out that '[j]udges who would be seen by their 
colleagues as blind followers of the policies of their governments would soon be 
discredited and could therefore hardly serve as a forceful champion of the legitimate 
aspirations of their home countries'. Tomuschat, 'National Representation of Judges and 
Legitimacy of International Jurisdictions', p. 183. 
59 
See, e.g. Art. 31 (1) ICJ Statute. 
60 
See, e.g. Art. 9 ICJ Statute prescribing 'that in the body [ of the ICJ] as a whole the 
representation of the main forms of civilisations and of the principal legal systems of the 
world should be assured'. 
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If in a court case, there happens to sit, e.g. due to the predetermined 
composition of a chamber, no judge on the bench who is a national of a 
state party to the dispute, or when ( only) a judge of the nationality of the 
opposing party to the dispute sits, then the 'non-represented' party will be 
allowed to elect a judge ad hoc (which will in practice most often be a 
national of that state).61 There is a sort of presumption ofbias of the ad 
hoc judge in favour of his appointing state.62 As the British judge Sir 
Gerald Fitzmaurice remarked in a debate on a study by the International 
Law Institute: 'le vote d'un juge ad hoc est un vote plus ou moins acquis 
d' avance pour son pays ... Tandis que la premiere loyaute des juges 
reguliers est envers la Cour, celle d'un juge ad hoc est envers son pays.'63 
In fact, ad hoc judges almost always vote in favour of their designating 
state, even if they have to write a dissenting opinion for this, and even if 
they are completely isolated. 64 
Nevertheless, the deviation from the general principles of impartiality 
lying in both the non-recusal of an international judge in a case against 
his country and in the institution of the ad hoc judge, and the resulting 
endorsement of the conflict of interest can be justified. The first reason is 
respect for cultural and legal diversity. The second reason is to secure 
acceptance of the international courts and tribunals by the states parties 
and their population. lt must be reckoned with the 'instinctive mistrust 
felt by nations for a Court composed of foreign judges', as the former 
Secretary of State of the US phrased it in the session of the Advisory 
Committee of Jurists debating the creation of a permanent international 
court of justice.65 This antipathy against 'fremde Vogte' ('foreign reeves') 
forms, by the way, an important part of Swiss national mythology.66 
61 See, e.g. Art. 31(2) ICJ Statute. 
62 In a confidential interview, an ad hoc judge complained that 'members of the regular 
bench assume that he is biased in favour of the state that appointed him and conse-
quently do not take his views seriously'. Swigart, 'The National Judge', at 229. 
63 Etudes des amendements a apporter au statut de la Cour internationale de Justice, 
Observations de M. Gerald-Gray Fitzmaurice, Yearbook of the Institute of International 
Law, 1 (1954), 441-446, at 445. 
64 See for a detailed nuanced analysis Manouvel, Opinions separees a la Cour internationale, 
pp. 201-203. 
65 Elihu Root, Statement, in Permanent Court of International Justice, Advisory Commit-
tee of Jurists, Proces-Verbaux of the Proceedings of the Committee (16 June-24 July 1920) 
(Clark, New Jersey: The Lawbook Exchange Ltd., 2006), p. 538. 
66 The core objective of the early confederacy of the fourteenth century was to expel 
imperial judges. One of the central items of the Swiss Federal Charter of 1291 is that 
the Eidgenossen 'will accept or receive no judge in the aforesaid valleys, who shall have 
obtained his office for any price, or for money in any way whatever, or one who shall not 
..... 
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The creators of international courts therefore sought to assure the 
peoples: '[I]t must be possible to tel1 the masses that there will be at 
least one person upon the Court who is able to understand them: 67 In a 
limited sense, peoples have to feel 'represented' by 'their' judge ( even if 
this judge is independent and will not accept instructions). Thirdly, the 
national judge will secure that the voice of a state party be heard inside 
the councils of the judges. This hearing will assure that its arguments are 
taken seriously and that, where relevant, its national legal system will be 
understood.68 Fourthly, the institution of the national judge, especially 
in the situation where a national of the opposing party to the conflict is 
on the bench, is said to assure the equality of arms. 69 For these reasons, 
the existence of national judges and of ad hoc judges (who are clearly in 
a conflict of interest) is one of the conditions sine qua non of the 
functioning of the international judiciary.70 
4.3 The independence of arbitrators 
The proper fulfilment of the function of arbitration is mostly couched in 
terms of independence and impartiality, similarly with regard to 
judges.71 But sometimes it is phrased in conflict of interest language. 
An example for an explicit conflict of interest regulation is the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Understanding which governs the quasi-arbitral 
dispute settlement procedure for inter-state disputes arising from the 
treaties gathered under the WTO umbrella, such as the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The Dispute Settlement Understand-
ing stipulates: 'All persons serving on the Appellate Body ... shall not 
participate in the consideration of any disputes that would create a direct 
or indirect conflict of interest.'72 The accompanying Rules of conduct 
state that ' [ e J ach person covered by these Rules ... shall be independent 
be a native or a resident with us' (emphasis added). English in The Origin of the Swiss 
Confederation Section 1, Document vol. 1 (Aarau, 1933). Available at www.admin.ch/ 
org/polit/00056/index.html?lang=en (last accessed 15 December 2011). 
67 Root, Proces-Verbaux (note 65), p. 538. 
68 Vagts, 'The International Legal Profession', p. 257; Manouvel, Opinions separees, 
2005, p. 197. 
69 Manouvel, Opinions separees a la Cour internationale, p. 199. 70 Ibid., p. 203. 
71 See Hoffmann, 'Duty of Disclosure and Challenge of Arbitrators'; Tralanan, 'The 
Impartiality and Independence of Arbitrators Reconsidered'; Singhal, 'Independence 
and Impartiality of Arbitrators'; Larson, 'Conflicts of Interest and Disclosures'. 
72 Art. 17(3) Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dis-
putes of 15 April 1994, ILM 33 (1994), 114. 
380 ANNE PETERS 
and impartial, shall avoid direct or indirect conflicts of interest ... so 
that through the observance of such standards of conduct the integrity 
and impartiality of that mechanism are preserved'.73 
The issue of arbitrator independence and impartiality is tightly regu-
lated. lt is even held tobe overregulated.74 The numerous e:xisting stand-
ards differ amongst themselves. Hence the success of challenges to 
arbitrators' independence and impartiality has become somewhat unpre-
dictable, and this legal insecurity might be dysfunctional for arbitration. 
Arbitrators occupy both a private and a public role. In the commercial 
sphere, economic actors resort to arbitration because they want to avoid 
state courts. But arbitral awards have important repercussions beyond the 
parties, last but not least because they make law, the global lex mercatoria. 
ICSID arbitration has even more 'public governance' features, because 
respondents are states. lt is therefore unsurprising that approaches to 
arbitrator's conflict of interest are becoming increasingly strict. 75 
4.4 'Conflict of interest in international investment 
arbitration' (Chapter 6) 
Challenges to arbitrators have increased considerably over the last few 
years, and could become even more problematic in arbitral practice. 
This may be a direct consequence of the increased transparency of 
investment arbitration. The chapter by August Reinisch and Christina 
Knahr first outlines the applicable legal standards determining poten-
tial conflict of interest in investment arbitration, focusing on the ICSID 
Convention and the ICSID Arbitration Rules, and also taking into 
consideration the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. lt then discusses 
possible scenarios in which conflicts of interest can arise, describes some 
exemplary investment disputes where arbitrators were challenged and 
analyses how alleged conflict of interest of arbitrators was addressed. 
Finally, Reinisch and Knahr examine whether the existing mechanisms 
are appropriate to deal with the problem of conflict of interest in 
investment arbitration and ask whether there is anything that could 
73 Art. II(l) of the Rules of conduct for the understanding on rules and procedures 
governing the settlement of disputes, of 11 December 1996 (WT/DSB/RC/1 (96-5267)). 
74 Larson, 'Conflicts of Interest and Disclosures', pp. 880, 905, 919-920. 
75 See on the traditional lower standards of arbitrator independence with a view to finding 
qualified arbitrators p. 398. 
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be done to prevent the undesirable situation of challenges and potential 
disqualification of arbitrators from occurring in the first place. 
The first limb of the classic requirement, independence, is compromised 
when arbitrators have contact with a party or counsel of a party. However, 
a party-appointing system such as arbitration inherently presumes some 
acquaintance between the party and the arbitrator. Therefore, criteria to 
assess the appropriate degree of independence must be found, such as 
proximity, intensity, dependence, and materiality. The ICSID case law has 
adopted a 'robust approach', as Reinisch and Knahr call it. The link 
between a tribunal or committee member 'must be of an intensity that 
truly casts doubt on the ability to exercise independent judgement'.76 
Secondly, and more recently, questions relating to the second limb, 
impartiality or perceived lack of impartiality of ICSID arbitrators have 
surfaced. Impartiality has been called into question due to arbitrators' 
previously expressed opinion, also in their capacity as scholars. But of 
course an intense scholarly debate is an asset for investment arbitration. 
Only the display of such strong convictions on specific issues that would 
prevent the arbitrator from having an open mind for the facts in dispute 
can imply impartiality. 
Mechanisms to manage conflict of interest in arbitration are disclosure 
requirements and challenge procedures. For example, Article 57 ICSID 
Convention allows an arbitrator's challenge in the case of a 'manifest lack' 
of the qualities required by Article 14( 1) I CSID Convention, which is a high 
threshold. The threshold for sustaining a challenge appears to be lower 
under the International Bar Association (IBA) guidelines than under the 
ICSID Convention. But although the applicable written standards differ, 
there seems to be a marked convergence in practice, in particular with 
regard to the substantive grounds for determining that a conflict may 
undermine an arbitrator's independence or impartiality. In practice, the 
'manifest lack' standard seems to be influenced by the 'justifiable doubts' 
standard and is related to the 'reasonable third person' perspective. 
lt is an empirical fact that arbitrator challenges pursuant to the ICSID 
Convention rarely succeed. But maybe there is an institutional problem 
of a possible collegiate arbitrator bias in deciding on a conflict of interest 
of a colleague. Reinisch and Knahr conclude that the recent inflationary 
use of challenging mechanisms in ICSID proceedings may border on 
harassment tactics, but has also contributed to the development of an 
76 Reinisch and Knahr, 'Conflict of interest in international investment arbitration', 
Chapter 6 in this volume, p. 114. 
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increased awareness of improprieties that must be avoided in order to 
secure the integrity of the arbitration process. 
4.5 'Conflict of interest in universal human rights bodies' (Chapter 7) 
Michal Davala's chapter describes the rules (hard law, rules of procedure, 
codes of conduct) on independence, impartiality and conflict of interest for 
the members and office-holders of various types ofhuman rights monitor-
ing bodies (treaty-based and charter-based bodies), and for different pro-
cedures (state reports, individual complaints and special procedures). 
Conflict of interest can and should be addressed in two types of rules: in 
the selection requirements and in the procedural rules of the respective 
body dealing with individual communications. Davala finds that the 
existing rules on both levels are insufficient to secure independent judge-
ment. He proposes new mechanisms to reinforce the independence and 
impartiality of individuals acting as experts and quasi-judges in the univer-
sal human rights machinery, such as cooling-off periods for government 
officials before taking up their post in an international monitoring body, 
abolishment of the requirement of re-nomination by the government for 
re-election, longer terms of membership, and increased remuneration, or 
even the creation of a World Court on Human Rights which would be 
staffed with judges enjoying füll guarantees of judicial independence. 
Both treaty- and charter-based bodies need the highest degree of 
credibility. Only then their decisions, resolutions or other actions will 
be seen as objective outcomes and will be accepted. The reinforcement of 
the features of independence and expertise rather than the political 
character would enhance all the human rights mechanisms. 
4.6 The impartiality of the administration 
The harm done by conflict of interest in the public administration is, 
according to the OECD, that such conflict weakens adherence by public 
officials to the ideal of impartiality.77 Concomitantly, the active preven-
tion and management of conflict of interest in the administration is one 
way to safeguard the traditional core principle of the impartiality of 
public administration.78 That principle is not only a more traditional 
77 OECD (note 14), p. 98. 
78 See for France Mitard, 'L'impartialite administrative'; Commission de reflexion (note 13), 
pp. 45-55 with references to the case law of the Conseil d'Etat. See for Switzerland Art. 29 
of the Swiss Federal Constitution and Art. 10 of the Swiss Law on the federal 
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label for the absence of conflict of interest or administrators, but more-
over comprises, with regard to the administrators' activity, the require-
ments of a distance to the object of the decision, unbiasedness, 
neutrality, not allowing own interests to impact the administrative deci-
sion, non-identification with particular interests and the equal treatment 
of citizens.79 Impartiality is also a value of the EU administration. The 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights enshrines a right to good adminis-
tration which means that, ' [ e Jvery person has the right to have his or her 
affairs handled impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time by the 
institutions and bodies ofthe Union' (Article 41(1) ofthe Fundamental 
Rights Charter (emphasis added)).80 
To conclude, the principle of impartiality is to some extent a traditional 
expression of a very strict requirement of non-conflictedness. lt has been 
specifically developed for institutions whose function is to settle disputes 
between two parties, but is also relevant for the public administration which 
normally does not settle disputes. lt has been shown that this principle is 
relevant both on the national and on the international level, and both in the 
public and the private sphere. In particular, modern commercial arbitra-
tion blurs both boundaries: it is becoming more and more transnational 
and is neither a fully private nor fully public institution. 
5. Conflict of interest in politics 
5.1 The special case of elected holders of public office 
Holders of higher public office, who are often elected, not just 
appointed, such as members of government, members of parliament, 
judges of superior courts, members of court of audit and central or 
administrative procedure, in scholarship Schindler, Die Befangenheit der Verwaltung. In 
Germany, the 'obligation of neutrality' is a traditional core principle of the German civil 
service (Berufsbeamtentum). See also §§ 22 and 23 of the German federal law on 
administrative procedure, which has also been adopted by the German Länder; in 
scholarship Fehling, Verwaltung zwischen Unparteilichkeit und Gestaltungsaufgabe. In 
Turkey, civil servants are not even allowed to become a member of a political party 
(Art. 68 of the Turkish Constitution of 18 October 1982 (as amended on 23 July 1995): 
4121/6 Artide). 
79 Fehling, Verwaltung zwischen Unparteilichkeit und Gestaltungsaufgabe, p. 505. 
80 See also the 'European Code of Good Administrative Behavior' of 28 July 1999, in force 
since 1 January 2000. 'Good administration' has been qualified by the courts as a general 
principle ofEU law (CFI, Case T-54/99, max.mobil v. Commission, [2002) ECR II-00313, 
para. 48), and the right to good administration is a fundamental component of 
European citizenship. 
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national banks, should be distinguished from ordinary public employees 
or civil servants.81 Elected officials have a political mandate, i.e. they are 
accountable to the entire electorate, but only for the limited term of 
office. In contrast, civil servants are not elected, and they normally hold 
a position in the bureaucracy over a long period (as opposed to an 
electoral term of office). Working typically in one specific sector (hous-
ing, migration environmental issues, etc.), civil servants are more 
involved with details, so that there is a potential for a deep entanglement 
with societal and economic interests. (But note that not all areas of 
administration are equally prone to conflict of interest. Typical at-risk 
areas are public procurement82 and the health sector. 83 ) Finally, civil 
servants are legally accountable to their superiors in the hierarchy of the 
state bureaucracy, not directly politically accountable to the people. 
Due to these different features, conflict of interest regimes for civil 
servants should not be directly used for holders of political office. In fact, 
sanctions in relation to political office-holders are currently, in the EU 
member states, relatively soft compared to sanctions for civil servants' 
misbehaviour. 84 It should be seriously considered whether this relative 
softness is appropriate to the distinct functions of political office-
holders, or whether tightening were adequate. An example of a recent 
code of conduct for government members is the Ministerial Code of the 
United Kingdom. It states that 'Ministers must ensure that no conflict 
arises, or appears to arise, between their public duties and their private 
interests.'85 
With regard to one particular conflict of interest arising from dual 
roles, the position of members of government is different in political 
systems of parliamentary democracy and in presidential democracies. 
A characteristic of parliamentary democracies (such as the UK or 
Germany) is that members of parliament may become members of the 
government without giving up their membership in parliament. This 
means that a conflict of interest between two roles (governing role and 
81 See for comparative studies specifically on conflict of interest of elected officials, notably 
legislators: Speck, 'Conflict of Interest' ( on Argentina, Brazil and Chile); Kaye, 'Reluctant 
Innovators' (on the US and the UK). 
82 Schindler, 'Conflict of interest and the administration of public affairs - a Swiss 
perspective', Chapter 9 in this volume. 
83 See pp. 409-410 on the World Health Organization (WHO). 
84 Demmke et al., Regulating Conflicts of Interest, p. 8. 
85 Cabinet Office, May 2010, para. 1.2.f. See also s. 6 'Ministers' constituency and party 
interests'; s. 7: 'Ministers' private interests'. 
i 
MANAGING CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
legislative role) is inbuilt in the system. In contrast, systems of presiden -
tial democracy (such as the US and to a limited extent France) are 
characterised by an incompatibility between membership in parliament 
and in the government. 86 
It has been speculated that the empirical relation between conflict of 
interest legislation and the different forms of democratic government 
has something to do with the different institutional traditions: in presi-
dential systems, conflict of interest has traditionally been addressed by 
legislation and hard law solutions exist. In contrast, in parliamentary 
systems, conflict of interest is rather a recent issue.87 However, the fact 
that the accumulation of two different political functions is considered 
normal in parliamentary democracies does not explain this differing 
approach. Parliamentary systems also provide for the incompatibility 
of government membership with other offices, professions and trade,88 
and do not display a general insensitivity towards the accumulation of 
offices. lt may be noted that the members of the EU 'government', the 
EU Commissioners, are subject to a far-reaching incompatibility rule 
(Article 245 TFEU).89 
86 See e.g. Art. 23 French Constitution of 28 September 1958: '(l) Membership of the 
Government is incompatible with the exercise of any Parliamentary mandate, with the 
holding of any representational office at national level in a trade organisation, and with 
any public employment or professional activity' (emphasis added). The explanation for 
the tradition of incompatibility in presidential democracies is that the president ( and his 
administration) has an independent basis of authority (not based on the elections to 
parliament). 
87 Hine, 'Conclusion', pp. 218-225, 220. 
88 See, e.g. Art. 66 of the German Basic Law: 'Neither the Federal Chancellor nor a Federal 
Minister may hold any other salaried office, or engage in any trade or profession, or 
belong to the management or, without the consent of the Bundestag, to the supervisory 
board of an enterprise conducted for profit.' 
89 Art. 245 TFEU: 'The Members of the Commission shall refrain from any action incom-
patible with their duties. Member States shall respect their independence and shall not 
seek to influence them in the performance of their tasks. The Members of the Commis-
sion may not, during their term of office, engage in any other occupation, whether 
gainful or not. When entering upon their duties they shall give a solemn undertaking 
that, both during and aftet their term of office, they will respect the obligations arising 
therefrom and in particular their duty to behave with integrity and discretion as regards 
the acceptance, after they have ceased to hold office, of certain appointments or benefits. 
In the event of any breach of these obligations, the Court of Justice may, on application 
by the Council acting by a simple majority or the Commission, rule that the Member 
concerned be, according to the circumstances, either compulsorily retired in accordance 
with Article 247 or deprived of his right to a pension or other benefits in its stead' 
( emphasis added). This provision is complemented and detailed by the Code of Conduct 
for Commissioners (C (2011) 2904). 
386 ANNE PETERS 
5.2 'Politicians as judges? Conflict of interest in Swiss Parliament during 
decisions on the validity of popular initiatives' (Chapter 11) 
One group of elected politicians are parliamentarians. For them, speci~c 
conflict of interest situations arise, because they pass a number oflaws m 
their own interest, such as laws on their own remuneration, on parlia-
mentary immunity, on political parties or on election financing. Gener-
ally speaking, conflict of interest of members of parliaments is, a~;ording 
to a comparative study on EU member states, under-regulated. 
Anna Christmann's chapter deals with a specific conflict of interest 
arising for members of the Swiss federal parliament in a political system 
which places a high value on direct democracy. The study exemplifies 
how a conflict of interest arising for political actors may indeed under-
mine the constitutional principle of the separation of powers. 
Under the Swiss Constitution, Swiss citizens may launch a legislative 
proposal ( called 'popular initiative') which must then be put to vote before 
the entire citizenry. Any such proposal must be in conformity with per-
emptory international norms. The Swiss Constitution allocates the task ~f 
scrutiny to the federal parliament, and not to a court. The reason for th1s 
allocation is respect for popular sovereignty. The idea is that parliament is 
closer to the people, and therefore better suited than a court to take a 
decision which might result in preventing the people to take a democratic 
vote. By performing the legal scrutiny of the proposal before it is put to vote, 
members of parliament (MPs) act in a secondary role as quasi-judges. 
Christmann raises the question whether members of parliament really 
decide on the admissibility of popular initiatives on legal rather than on 
political grounds. In a first step, she analysed the statistic~ on ~oting 
behaviour of the different parliamentary factions, and also mterv1ewed 
Swiss MPs. She found that the centre party's members vote highly 
strategically, whereas left-wing parties members' are in a conflict 
between liberal and republican values: liberal values demand respect of 
higher law which would suggest qualifying legally dubious popular 
initiatives as inadmissible. In contrast, republican values suggest uphold-
ing the admissibility of such initiatives. The right-wing (populist) ~arty's 
members face no conflict at all because they do not - accordmg to 
Christmann - take legal aspects into account. 
Christmann concludes that the majority of Swiss parliamentarians 
decide on political rather than on legal grounds when scrutinising 
the legality of a popular referendum. One reason for this is that 
90 Demmke et al., Regulating Conflicts of Interest, p. 37. 
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parliamentarians are not equipped for such a review, because they lack 
legal expertise. Another, even more important reason might be the 
conflict of interest in which they find themselves: their capability of 
judging the legality of the initiative in front of them is tainted by their 
personal interest in being re-elected, which requires them not to disap-
point their voters. Acting as 'judges' means performing a function that is 
incumbent on a different branch of government. 
These findings are not only relevant for the Swiss review process of 
popular initiatives, but also for the general question of separation of 
powers. When MPs are confronted with different institutional roles, they 
do not necessarily opt for the appropriate role but for the more conveni-
ent one with respect to future electoral success or other personal object-
ives. Their decision is biased by their personal interests, just like 
decisions taken by board members or managers, who do not always 
decide in the best interest of their company but in their own interests. If 
one seeks for decisions based on legal considerations, parliament might 
not be the adequate institution. 
) 91 d . . 11 h While Braendle and Stutzers chapter emonstrates empmca y t at 
the presumed conflict of interest in which parliamentarian administra-
tors find themselves is less pernicious than constitutional designers 
expect, Christmann's findings point to the opposite direction: a conflict 
between the parliamentarians' job of properly applying legal rules and 
their personal strategical interest pleasing the voters has the pernicious 
effect of leading to a too lenient scrutiny of proposals. 
5.3 'Conflict of interest of heads of state: the example 
of Madagascar' ( Chapter 13) 
Jan Christoph Richter's chapter uses the example of the former President 
of Madagascar, Marc Ravalomanana (2002-2009), to illustrate the 
dimensions of conflict of interest caused by the business activities of a 
head of state in a developing country where accountability mechanisms 
are particularly weak. When he came to power, Ravalomanana owned 
one of Madagascar's largest companies, a dairy business. Over the course 
of his administration, his companies underwent considerable expansion. 
In the end, significant sectors of his business empire were destroyed 
during countrywide lootings until the President was ousted from power. 
Richter draws generalisable conclusions on some features of legislative 
91 Braendle and Stutzer, 'A dilemma in the separation of powers: public servants as 
legislators', Chapter 10 in this volume. 
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frameworks addressing conflict of interest of elected officials, he suggests 
in which processes these should be developed, and derives recommen-
dations for donor institutions. 
First, conflict of interest regulation should serve a dual objective: to 
dissuade elected officials from misconduct and to guide and protect 
them from false accusations. Secondly, regulation should take into 
account the particularities of the respective official position. For 
example, heads of state may be in office for one term only. Far-reaching 
restrictions of private sector interests and activities may therefore cause 
dependency on the public office and limit the pool of talents. 
Thirdly, the real chance of enforcing regulation on conflict of interest 
should be carefully considered. Enforcement may be unrealistic in 
developing countries where the notion of conflict of interest is relatively 
new and formal oversight institutions are weak. Especially one core 
element of conflict of interest regulation, namely the exclusion from 
decision-making processes, may be particularly difficult to apply to some 
offices. For example, heads of state with widespread business interests 
will find it difficult to govern if they exclude themselves from all deci-
sions that affect their business interests. 
Fourthly, transparency and proactive communication appear to be of 
paramount importance for effectively managing such conflict of interest. 
In developing countries with weak formal oversight institutions, the civil 
society and the media may play an essential role both in raising general 
awareness with regard to conflict of interest and as watchdogs that hold 
top-level elected officials accountable. 
Clearly, mere replication of regulatory schemes on conflict of interest 
regulation from developed countries in countries where accountability 
mechanisms and rule of law are weak is unlikely to be successful. 
Concepts and the measures to address such conflict of interest need to 
take into consideration the weaknesses of the local governance systems, 
and local values and traditions. 
These insights are important for donors. They should avoid the 
application of 'one size fits all' solutions that may not be applicable in 
the country context and therefore might be unrealistic to implement. 
Instead, they should support the development of contextualised con-
cepts and solutions, based both on research and on public consultations. 
Donors should also continuously assess the efforts to address such 
conflict of interests. Lack of credible efforts should have a substantial 
impact on donor risk assessments and the allocation of their support. 
A focus on measures directed at strengthening formal and informal 
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oversight institutions rather than reforms driven by the executive seems 
paramount. If trained properly, investigative journalists and local NGOs 
with a focus on conflid of interest could assume a monitoring role. 
6. Financial interests 
A comparative study of conflict of interest regulation in EU member states 
found that most policies divide conflict of interest into two types, those 
involving pecuniary interests, and those involving non-pecuniary inter-
ests.92 In this volume, three chapters deal in particular with financial 
interests of managers and other actors in the financial and corporate world. 
6.1 'Conflict of interest: compliance and its contribution to corporate 
governance in the financial services sector' (Chapter 14) 
Monika Roth's chapter analyses conflict of interest as part of good 
corporate governance. Roth asks whether and when compliance as a 
concept can contribute to a better understanding and awareness for 
identifying and dealing with conflict of interest in the financial sector 
and what this means, for example, for strategic decisions. 
Roth argues that in private banking, the novel culture of financial 
innovation has done more harm than good. Since banks began to create 
and to sell financial products, their new role has clouded their judge-
ment about the difference between being someone's agent and being the 
seller of products. With the creation of the new products, banks became 
institutionally opposed to dealing with conflict of interest in an appro-
priate way, because that conflict of interest has become an inherent 
element of their business case. 
Advisers have come under explicit or unspoken pressure to load up 
their clients' portfolios with products which earn the highest fee for their 
bank. Whatever the adviser then does, he damages either the legally and 
contractually defined interests of the dient, or he misses the declared or 
immanent objectives set by the bank (his employer). The fees and 
incentive schemes which are linked to the new products exacerbates 
the problem. Bank advisers are often paid according to the fees they 
earn for their employer by selling products. So their own financial 
interest prevails (as a secondary interest). 
92 Demmke et al., Regulating Conflicts of Interest, p. 28. 
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In this situation, it can hardly be ensured that each specific transaction 
in an asset management relationship is well founded and in the interest 
of the dient, regardless of the coexisting bank's own or other clients' 
interests. Therefore, Roth concludes, the proper management of a con-
flict of interest may even require management to reject a business idea 
because this business would create an intrinsic conflict of interest. 
Business ideas built on the existence of conflict of interest undermine 
or destroy the mechanisms and safeguards established by the legislator, 
such as transparency and accountability requirements. 
The debate about conflict of interest, compliance and its contribution 
to corporate governance (and performance) must, according to Monika 
Roth, focus on the role of the board, the CEO, and on the rules for 
governing a company. Notably the board, which appoints the CEO and 
which is responsible for the strategy, must endorse a clear compliance 
culture and compliance principles. 
Decisions about products and services, including the renouncement 
on a service, form a key building block in the successful management of 
compliance starting from the top. What matters, says Roth, is not the 
organisation, but creating a new spirit about how to deal with conflict of 
interests. Ultimately, Monika Roth pleads for integrity: management 
must behave so that it can be trusted, and compensations schemes must 
reward performance with integrity. 
6.2 'Conflict of interest and the furore over banker 
compensation' (Chapter 15) 
Andrew Stark's chapter uncovers a specific conflict of interest arising for 
top managers in the financial sector, more specifically for senior execu-
tives in publicly held investment banks. Publicly held banks are banks 
owned by shareholders in the legal form of a listed stock company. 
In the past, senior executives have often ( expressly or implicitly) 
threatened to leave their bank for a private equity firm if they do not 
earn enough money, in form of a salary and annual bonuses. This threat 
has led to very high salaries and bonuses. 
In this context, two types of conflicts of interest arise. First, there is an 
internal conflict: the prospect of a financial gain ( or bonus) incites the 
executives to violate the fiduciary duty they bear towards investors and 
shareholders. The likeliness of a violation of that fiduciary duty stems 
from the fact that the bonuses and compensations are typically not 
clawed back. This fact incites the executives to incur unreasonable risks 
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for the firm, and hence for the shareholders, because they themselves 
do not risk anything with regard to their personal income. They will 
not suffer any loss of remuneration or bonus even if the firm suffers 
a loss. 
Secondly, a conflict of interest arises when private employers promise 
higher remunerations. (Stark calls this conflict an 'external' one, because 
the promise comes from the outside of the current role of the manager.) 
This situation constitutes a threat of a conflict of interest because 
distinct features are present in this constellation, features which distin-
guish the situation from ordinary bargaining on the labour market, for 
example by doctors or lawyers. 
The executives switch roles and migrate across the dividing line from a 
professional to a principal. This results in a situation in which the banker 
or executive who makes the threat of leaving his publicly held firm is 
abandoning the principals to whom he owes a duty while at the same 
time putting himself in their place. According to Stark, this constitutes a 
kind of 'fiduciary betrayal'. 
As a remedy, Stark suggests a cooling-off period for senior public bank 
managers who threaten to move, just as it is now prescribed in many 
jurisdictions for senior public officials such as ministers, secretaries of 
state or governors. A senior banker should, for example, be barred for a 
year after leaving his public bank job from taking a position with a 
private equity or hedge fund. 
Stark's chapter comprises a suggestion for transferring a mechanism 
originally designed for the sphere of 'public' governance (in this case the 
cooling-off period) to the sphere of 'private' governance. Such legal 
transfers could be envisaged with regard to other instruments for man-
aging conflict of interest too. 
6.3 'Conflict of interest related to management and board 
payments - profit-based remuneration systems make 
things worse' (Chapter 16) 
Lukas Handschin's chapter explores a particular type of conflict of 
interest in corporations concerning the remuneration of the top man-
agement and of the board members of a stock company ( exemplified by 
the stock company under Swiss law, with comparative references to other 
legal systems). Typically, the board of directors of a stock company 
decides on its own salary. This situation is beset by a conflict of interest, 
because the board members are torn between realising the best interest 
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of the company by deciding on a reasonable level of remuneration, and 
their own, personal pecuniary interest in a high salary. 
Recusal rules are too weak to prevent self-interested decisions, because 
the board members mutually serve each other by tacit understanding. 
The owners of the stock company, the shareholders, cannot exercise 
effective control over this phenomenon, because they are not organised 
and do not speak with one voice. Disclosure of remuneration does not 
help either, because the shaming factor does not deter shameless person-
alities, and hardly functions in cultures where making (a lot of) money is 
accepted by the general public. Transferral of the decision on board 
remunerations to the principals, acting in the General Assembly, is not 
feasible either. 
Profit-based remuneration (e.g. in form ofbonuses) seems tobe a way 
out of the conflict of interest, because it seems to align the board 
members' personal interest with that of the company. However, the 
chapter demonstrates that far from eliminating the conflict of interest, 
profit-based remuneration exacerbates it. One reason is that there is 
hardly any objective yardstick to measure the specific success to which 
the bonus is linked. Even defining the figures is a matter of evaluation. 
Accounting rules are not mathematical formulas, but (legal) rules. By 
definition, they leave room for discretion and even for falsification by the 
board of directors. In the end, the board does not merely state, but 
actually defines the profit of the company. Faced with the prospect of 
success-based remuneration, board members are tempted to show a 
profit which is not realistic. The consequence of showing such fictitious 
profits leads to a cash-out to the shareholders which puts the company at 
risk. So the conflict of interest leads to further harms. 
However, small companies need these schemes to attract good man-
agers. This means that the conflict of interest resulting from success-
based remuneration cannot be resolved by simply banning such remu-
neration schemes. Other solutions must therefore be found. 
According to Handschin, the only way is to ensure that the persons 
who make these decisions on behalf of the company or who participate 
in the decision-making process act only and exclusively in the interest of 
the company. The incentive structures must assure that these persons are 
not conflicted when making decisions affecting the valuation of assets 
and risks. In other words, they must not have a personal interest in the 
result of these decisions. If their remuneration is linked to the company's 
profit, they are unable to act independently and are in fact in a conflict 
of interest. 
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The problem could be solved by introducing a novel organisational 
structure, for example audit committees, staffed with non-executive and 
independent members, to control the exercise of discretion related to the 
definition of the profit. A different solution could be the adoption of a 
remuneration scheme which relates to 'objective' (for example cash-flow-
related) figures or to so-called prudent figures (namely prudence-based 
valuation rules) which bear much less the risk that the shown profits are 
fictitious. Furthermore, the determination of the remuneration could be tied 
to specific benchmarks, such as the achievement of a specific business plan. 
7. Unconflictedness and disinterestedness versus expertise 
and connectedness 
Three chapters of this book illustrate that avoiding and banning conflict 
of interest comes with a cost. The disinterestedness of the 'clean' deci-
sion-makers has its price, notably the loss of expertise, of social capital 
or just of familiarity with the field. The trade-off between purity and 
performance must be made in all spheres of governance, be it in global 
politics, law and administration (as Chapter 5 explains), in the domestic 
public sphere (Chapter 10), or in the sphere of medicine which is 
normally regulated on the domestic or even local level and where 
professional self-regulation abounds (Chapter 18). 
7.1 'How to start thinking about confiict of interest in global 
governance' (Chapter 5) 
Rene Uruefia, in Chapter 5, suggests starting thinking on conflict of 
interest in global governance on the basis of four theses: first, that the 
role of conflict of interest regulation in global governance is essentially 
different from its domestic namesake; secondly, that difference is due to 
the all-important role that expertise plays in global governance; thirdly, 
that the role of expertise in global governance triggers a paradox, which 
can be put as follows: regulation (and control) of expert power in global 
governance is dependent in its legitimacy on the very expertise it tries to 
regulate and control; and fourthly, that in order to escape a conceptual 
dead-end that may emerge from such a paradox, it seems promising to 
turn to the language of virtue ethics, in order to rethink conflict of 
interest at a truly global level. 
Uruefia begins by discussing the role of international law in global 
governance focusing on legal instrumentalism, and then turns to the two 
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principal reconstructive projects it has triggered: global constitutional-
ism and global administrative law. He explores the important role played 
by expertise in each of these projects. The next section describes the 
paradoxical relation of expertise and conflict of interest regulation. 
Finally, Urvuefia proposes reading conflict of interest as an ethical 
problem, and draws on virtue ethics in order to rethink the role of 
conflict of interest regulation in global governance. 
7.2 'A dilemma in the separation of powers: public servants 
as legislators' ( Chapter 10) 
Chapter 10 is authored by two economists, Thomas Braendle and Alois 
Stutzer. lt analyses the conflict of interest in which members of parlia-
ment who are at the same time civil servants find themselves in. This 
type of conflict affects the liberal constitutional principle of a separation 
of powers. In order to preserve such a separation of powers, some 
countries prescribe that public servants have to withdraw from office 
even before they accept a candidacy for parliament. Other states require 
parliamentarians to give up or to stay their employment as a civil servant 
during their term as a parliamentarian.93 No rule of ineligibility or 
incompatibility exists with regard to the civil servants (Beamte) of the 
German Länder, which is why the authors were able to collect data from 
these jurisdictions. 
Braendle and Stutzer then examine the consequences of a strong 
representation of public servants in parliament. Parliamentarians 
playing the dual role as agents in the public service and as principals 
who supervise the public service in parliament are prima facie beset by a 
conflict of interest which potentially undermines the constitutional 
principle of the separation of powers. 
On the other hand, parliamentarians who are at the same time civil 
servants might be able to perform their role as parliamentarians better 
than anybody else. They have insider information, they are particularly 
loyal to the state, they have more time to dedicate themselves to parlia-
mentary activity, and they are independent from lobbyism and the 
pressure of industry. Exactly because of their secondary affiliation to 
the executive branch, they might be even more motivated tha:n other 
93 See, e.g. Art. 144 of the Swiss Federal Constitution. Art. L23 l of the French Code 
electoral, version consolidee au 19 May 2011. 
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parliamentarians to exercise the oversight function over that branch 
properly. For these reasons, a strong representation of public servants 
might improve parliamentary performance. 
This theoretical reasoning is empirically tested by the authors with the 
help of a data set for the German Länder. The oversight activity by those 
Länder parliaments is measured by counting parliamentarian interpel-
lations. The data show that more interpellations are submitted in those 
parliaments in which the fraction of civil servants is higher. Civil servants 
are obviously more active in parliamentary oversight than their fellow 
members of parliament. This means that the presence of dual-function 
holders actually improves parliamentary oversight instead of inhibiting it. 
The conclusion is that the conflict of interests in which those dual 
function holders find themselves is not pernicious, because the parlia-
mentarians-civil servants (as the data show) do not restrain themselves 
out of any loyalty to the administration. On the contrary, they do 
exercise control seriously, and thereby work 'against' their second affili-
ation. This suggests that strict ineligibility rules are not necessary to 
preserve the operationality of the principle of separation of powers. 
7.3 'Conflict of interest at the bedside: surrogate decision-making 
at the end of life' ( Chapter 18) 
In this chapter, Susan Shapiro explores the inbuilt tension besetting 
fiduciary or trust relationships, namely that the most able and desirable 
trustees - those who offer familiarity, commitment, knowledge, inside 
information, expertise, experience and political, financial and social 
capital - are, precisely because of their insiderness, also least likely to 
be disinterested. 
She studies this tension with regard to a particularly asymmetric and 
vulnerable fiduciary relationship in the medical setting, namely the 
relationship between a surrogate decision-maker and an incompetent 
patient. Shapiro relies on data from a multi-year ethnographic study of 
more than 2,000 patients who passed through either the neurological or 
the medical intensive care unit of a large urban US teaching hospital. 
Shapiro first identifies possible sources of conflict of interest arising 
for the surrogate decision-maker, namely his or her financial interests, 
the caretaking responsibilities demanded of family members, emotional 
needs such as fear of loss and finally religious beliefs - all of which might 
interfere with his or her judgement when taking medical decisions on 
behalf of the patient. 
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Most surrogate decision-makers do not talk about any conflict of 
interest, especially when they are close to the patient (as a family 
member or friend). If at all, the issue is voiced in discussions with 
parents of younger patients. This, of course, does not mean that conflicts 
do not exist, but rather that they are either unconscious or deliberately 
denied. Surrogates tend to delude themselves that their interests repli-
cated those of the patients or simply ignore the patients' preferences.94 
In reality, however, all surrogate decisions, except those by a state-
appointed guardian, are made by conflicted fiduciaries, and some are 
tainted by these conflicts. Against this background, and knowing that the 
mentioned sources of conflict of interest are much more relevant for family 
members than for strangers to the patients, some bioethicists have sug-
gested that family members should be barred from acting as a surrogate. 
But this proposal, argues Shapiro, takes us füll circle to the tension between 
conflicted intimates who know us well and disinterested strangers who do 
not. Patients might still prefer the former, even with the baggage, i.e. the 
likelihood of conflictedness, they bring to the role. Moreover, in many cases 
the patients might indeed subordinate their interests to the interests of their 
children or other family members. In that case, the surrogate decision-
maker could legitimately bring in his or her personal interest. 
Ultimately, the question is whether or not 'conflict of interest' is an 
appropriate concept to frame situations where interests of the trust giver 
and of the trustees are often interdependent and in which objective 
information or self-awareness about where the interests really diverge is 
largely missing. Shapiro gives an affirmative answer. She considers the 
concept of conflict of interest appropriate, with the caveat that for both 
the intimates themselves and for outsiders, 'disinterestedness will be more 
of a work in progress'. She concludes that the best strategy to manage 
conflict of interest in this particular medical context is to identify and 
clarify any divergence of interest when the patients are still competent. 
7.4 The trade-off 
The three book chapters summarised in the preceding section have 
exemplified that it might be well worth tolerating conflict of interest in 
order to benefit from the conflicted agents' expertise. This section places 
those three constellations in context. 
94 See on this psychological phenomenon p. 370. 
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The dilemma between unconflictedness (impartiality, independence 
disinterestedness) and expertise is classical. The reason is that real life 
expertise is normally controversial, 'political', and interest bound. In most 
societal spheres, decision-makers' expertise is co-constituted by their 
knowledge of the key players in the field and their integration into the 
networks of the community. These capacities bring with them the risk of 
a conflict of interest. Benefiting from this type of expertise necessarily 
means to renounce on disinterestedness. 
The dilemma has been acknowledged in all three spheres of govern-
ance. For public governance, Cardinal Richelieu, Prime Minister of 
France from 1624 to 1642, wrote: '[L] a probite du conseiller d'Etat ... 
n'empeche pas qu'un homme ne puisse pas faire ses affaires en faisant 
celles de l'Etat, mais elle lui defend seulement d'y penser au prejudice des 
interets publics, qui lui doivent etre plus chers que sa propre vie.'95 
Richelieu preferred a corrupt minister to an incompetent one, because 
the incompetent one would always make the wrong decisions, whereas 
the corrupt one could still, in some instances, not let himself be guided 
by his proper interests, and then could make a good decision. 96 
Richelieu's insight has been seized upon by modern observers of public 
governance. lt has been argued that the state is often served better by an 
official who deviates from principles than by the one who scrupulously 
respects them but whose competence is limited to this. There is - from 
that perspective - also 'productive corruption'.97 Indeed, Jan Christoph 
Richter's chapter in this volume illustrated that, in Madagascar, a busi-
nessman has been elected as a head of state exactly because of his 
economic expertise, and despite his conflictedness. 98 
With regard to the financial sphere, Richelieu's wisdom is applicable 
as well. lt has been pointed out that ' [ t] he principals may have to settle 
for a lower standard of quality in exchange for higher integrity, and 
the trade-off is not easy to quantify'. 99 The argument is here that 'a 
qualified but conflicted agent is often preferable to an honest but 
incompetent one'. 100 
95 
Richelieu, CEvres du cardinal de Richelieu, p. 33. 96 Ibid., pp. 33-34. 
97 
Jacques Dufresne, Conflits d'interets: Pour une ethique realiste, 1 October 2001, available 
a t http:// ago ra. q c. ca/Documents/ Conflit_ din terets-Po ur_ une _ ethiq ue _realiste _par _ 
Jacques_Dufresne (last accessed 15 December 2011). 
98 
Richter, 'Conflict of interest ofheads of state: the example of Madagascar', Chapter 13 in 
this volume. 
99 
Thevenoz and Bahar, Conflict of Interest, p. 7. 100 Ibid., p. 14. 
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In the commercial sphere, the tension between unconflictedness and 
expertise has been most clearly articulated with regard to arbitrators, and 
f b . . 101 H · · is even considered a characteristic feature o ar 1tratlon. ence, 1t 1s 
controversial whether the same standard of impartiality and independ-
102 · · · ence should apply to judges and to arbitrators. A promment v1ew 1s 
that these standards should be less strict for arbitrators, because arbitra-
tors are 'men of affairs, not apart from, but of the marketplace', as two US 
Supreme Court justices put it in a leading case on the disqualification of 
arbitrators. 103 That case concerned a commercial suit between a subcon-
tractor and a prime contractor. The subcontractor challenged an arbitra-
tor who was an engineering consultant whose services were used 
sporadically by the prime contractor. The Justice's concurring opinion 
highlighted the dilemma of having to choose between expertise and 
disinterestedness, by arguing that there is 'no reason automatically to 
disqualify the best informed and most capable potential arbitrators'. From 
that perspective, arbitrators should not be 'automatically disqualified by a 
business relationship with the parties before them'. There should not be 
disqualification especially when both parties have been informed of the 
relationship in advance, or if the relationship is 'trivial'. 
104 
The traditional reason given for the lenient approach to arbitrator 
independence and impartiality is that economic actors choose arbitra-
tion as a mode of dispute resolution mainly because of the arbitrator's 
expertise for the subject at stake, and that this requires a trade-off 
between expertise and impartiality. But this reasoning seems to be 
outdated. Economic actors nowadays do not primarily seek, through 
arbitration, a fair compromise, but a neutral adjucative process in which 
an independent legal analysis takes place.
105 
lt therefore seems more 
appropriate to hold arbitrators to the same standards of impartiality as 
judges.106 Once again, this issue exemplifies a convergence of the 'public' 
sphere (adjudication) and the 'private' one (arbitration). 
101 Larson, 'Conflicts of Interest and Disclosures', pp. 890-891. 
102 See on this controversy Singhal, 'Independence and Impartiality of Arbitrators', 
pp. 125-126. 
103 US Supreme Court, Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty, concurring 
opinion by justices White and Marshall (393 US 145 (1968), at 150). 
104 Ibid. (emphasis added). 
105 Singhai, 'Independence and Impartiality of Arbitrators', pp. 125-126. 
106 Cf. in that direction the International Bar Association (IBA) which do not allow for a 
distinction between sole arbitrators, party-appointed arbitrators and tribunal chairs 
(IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, approved on 
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With regard to global governance, Rene Uruefia has pointed out that 
expertise is a primary source of the ( social) legitimacy of global governance 
( due to the weakness or even lack of other sources oflegitimacy or beliefs in 
legitimacy, such as tradition or patriotism). Therefore the control of expert 
power and of the 'politics of expertise'107 through conflict of interest 
regulation is more problematic on the global level and must not unduly 
cancel out or neutralise the expertise of the global decision-makers. 108 
The dilemma between expertise and disinterestedness, described for 
all spheres of governance, basically means that stricter rules with require-
ments for distance to the subject matter will inevitably carry with them a 
loss of decision-makirtg capacity. And it also means that, inversely, 
benefiting from expertise means having to renounce on strict conflict 
of interest regulation. The sociological insight (Chapter 18) then is that 
this tension between disinterestedness and expertise (including familiar-
ity with the issue or with the principals), although conflict of interest is 
perceived and acknowledged as a problem, is accepted and even 
embraced by some principals. 
This observation should inform regulatory choices. Banning conflict 
of interest inevitably means renouncing on the benefits the trustees offer. 
Any regulatory strategy must therefore be aware of trading off the 
benefits of insiderness against the benefits of disinterestedness. The 
regulator should take into account that in many contexts, the addressees 
of the law apparently cherish the benefits of insiderness highly, and are 
prepared to tolerate its flip-side, namely conflictedness. This leads to 
suggesting a less rigorous approach to conflict of interest which should 
not seek to eradicate all instances of real or apparent conflict. 
8. The benefits of conflict of interest 
Combating conflict of interest is, as the preceding section showed, costly. 
Endorsing conflict of interest does not only avoid these costs, but 
possibly conveys additional, specific benefits. Two chapters in this 
volume highlight these. 
22 May 2004 by the Council of the International Bar Association, General Standard 5 
(p. 14), available at www.ibanet.org/Publications/publications_IBA_guides_and_ free_ 
materials.aspx (last accessed 15 December 2011). 
107 Kennedy, 'The Politics of the Invisible College'. 
108 Uruena, 'How to start thinking about conflict of interest in global governance?', Chapter 
5 in this volume. 
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8.1 'Private vices, public benefits? Small town bureaucratisation 
in Namibia' (Chapter 12) 
Gregor Dobler analyses a typical conflict of interest on the governance level 
of local administration in a developing country. Making use of empirical 
material from a border boom town in Northern Namibia, this chapter 
recounts how the town administrator in a small Namibian town uses the 
rhetoric ofhis office (namely by threatening to enforce the law) in order to 
seek an 'arrangement'. The arrangement consists in him granting a favour to 
someone by not enforcing the legal prohibition. The administrator can only 
apply the threat within the limits of, and by referral to the official legal 
framework. But thereby he appropriates his office's power for his private 
aims. This generally turns the institutional role into an empty shell. 
Under certain conditions, however, private interests can lend power 
and relevance to the state's institutions. Dobler identifies conditions 
under which this process might happen. First, state institutionalisation 
must have surpassed a minimum threshold. The state must have the 
practical implementation capacity to matter on a local level, and it has to 
be able to eclipse other actors' powers. Secondly, administrators and 
administered must share a common understanding of what should, in 
theory, constitute the appropriate role behaviour. Finally, administrators 
have to fear consequences if they do not comply with the rules. If these 
three conditions are met, Dobler argues, the coupling of private and 
institutional interests in the end strengthens the institutional logic and 
confines private interests to ever narrower areas. 
To sum up, the chapter shows that even acts which go against the 
principal's short-term interests can, in the long run, lead to an increas-
ingly clear definition of institutional roles. It thus describes how indi-
vidual self-interest oflocal administrators can contribute to a process of 
institution building. Ultimately this means that conflict of interest is not 
per se bad, but under these con<litions, beneficial. 
8.2 'Conflict of interest from the perspective of the sociology 
of organised action' (Chapter 2) 
Erhard Friedberg calls into question the view that conflict of interest is 
bad. Conflict of interest is just another formulation of the classic princi-
pal-agent dilemma. It is, in structural terms, ubitiquous. No collective 
action, no society can be imagined without it. More even, conflict of 
interest will be experienced as a resource. 
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The question is, according to Friedberg (Chapter 2), not about elim-
inating the structural fact, but to control the discretionary and poten-
tially opportunistic behavioural problem. This means that considering 
conflict of interest as a problem is mainly ( or even purely) a matter of 
perception. Friedberg identifies the following reasons for the recent 
change of perception: the increase in complexity and interdependence 
of our societies, the sptead of democracy and the concomitant general 
distrust in hierarchical institutional set-ups, and a decrease of institu-
tional trust. Moreover, formerly fuzzy professional boundaries have 
hardened and tightened. This factions formerly unified fields of social 
and professional action into specialised spheres. Knowledge acquired in 
another sphere, instead of being a resource, becomes a reason for 
disqualification because it putatively generates a conflict of interest. 
For these reasons, conflict of interest is a structural problem in collective 
action. A feature of our modern societies is the emergence of network 
aristocracies. These thrive on the accumulation of roles in certain pos-
itions which in turn offer opportunities for discretionary action that 
benefits them, but might be potentially detrimental to the collective good. 
All considered, conflict of interest is not only inevitable, it is also ambigu-
ous. It can be profitable for the organisation, when well managed. 
9. Conflict of interest in multi-level governance: international 
versus national interests 
In this book, two chapters draw contrasting pictures of conflict of interest 
management in global governance. While Auguste Nganga Malonga 
(Chapter 4) highlights the commonalities between national and inter-
national bureaucracies, and calls for conflict of interest rules following 
the domestic model, Rene Uruefia ( Chapter 5) on the contrary insists on 
the difference between domestic and global administrations which, in his 
view, lies in the basis of legitimacy of international law and the role that 
expertise plays as an ersatz legitimacy in the sphere of global governance. 
In this section, another specific feature of conflict of interest in global, 
or rather in multi-level governance, shall be explored. This is the inbuilt 
tension between the international civil servants' formal responsibility 
exclusively towards the international organisation they serve and their at 
least latent loyalty towards their state of nationality. 109 
109 See on this tension with regard to international judges pp. 375-379. 
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It is generally said that the 'de-nationalisation' of the international 
organisations' staff ('international civil servants'), effectuated by the 
principles of independence together with impartiality and loyalty to the 
organisation, are a basic condition for the functioning of all international 
( or supranational) organisations. 110 Basically all international organisa-
tions' founding documents contain these principles. 111 For example, the 
provision on the European Commission in Article 17(3) TEU runs: 
The Commission's term of office shall be five years. The members of the 
Commission shall be chosen on the ground of their general competence 
and European commitment from persons whose independence is beyond 
doubt. In carrying out its responsibilities, the Commission shall be 
completely independent . . . [T]he members of the Commission shall 
neither seek nor take instructions from any Government or other insti-
tution, body, office or entity. They shall refrain from any action incom-
patible with their duties or the performance of their tasks. 112 
So while the underlying ideal demands that international secretariats be 
unencumbered by the influence of member states, there is in reality 
'always a potential conflict of loyalties'.11 3 This perennial conflict is 
normally not considered through the lens of the modern concept of 
conflict of interest. 114 Still, the entire set-up of the organisations reveals 
that the designers realistically acknowledge that the international secre-
tariats are not exclusively devoted to the organisation and clinically 
110 Schermers and Blokker, International Institutional Law, para. 524. Additionally, privil-
eges and immunities of staff members of international organisations are a specific tool 
to safeguard the staff's independence from the member states. See in detail Barnes, 
'Tenure and Independence in the United Nations International Civil Service'; Jonah, 
'Independence and Integrity of the International Civil Service'; Weiss, 'International 
Bureaucracy'; Tarassenko and Zacklin, 'Independence of International Civil Servants'. 
111 See, besides Art. 100 UN Charter ( quoted in Peters, 'Conflict of interest as a cross-
cutting problem of governance', Chapter 1 in this volume, p. 16) as further random 
examples: Art. 9 of the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation of 1 
November 1945; Art. VI(5) of the Constitution of the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) of 16 November 1945; Art. 37 of the 
Constititution of the World Health Organization of 22 July 1946. 
112 Emphases added. 113 Schreuer and Ebner, 'Art. 100', MN 4. 
114 For example, within the United Nations system, the concept of conflict of interest has 
rather been applied to circumstances in which international civil servants appear to 
benefit personally, especially in financial terms, from any business or transaction with 
the organisation they serve. See International Civil Service Commission (ICSC), Stand-
ards of Conduct for the International Civil Service (J anuary 2002), paras. 21-22, available 
at http://icsc.un.org/resources/pdfs/general/standardse.pdf (last accessed 15 December 
2011), endorsed by GA Res. 56/244 (2002). 
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isolated from their home country, but are in reality 'a grouping of 
conflicting loyalties'. 115 It is common-sensical that the nationality of an 
organisation's civil servant does play an informal role for his official 
decision-making. This unavowed expectation explains the requirements 
of a wide geographical basis, national quotas, and rotation schemes for 
the staff which exist in all international organisations. 116 
So in the staff of international organisations there is always a tension 
between the necessity of safeguarding its independence on the one hand, 
but on the other hand the member states' desire to have national de facto 
'representatives' in that staff. Although formally the member states cannot 
instruct or influence their national once he has been recruited, they are 
keen to have in place, in the organisation's staff, a person who has at least 
some sensitivity for the interests of the member state, and who can 
function as its interlocutor. In short, member states look for a vehicle to 
have national interests taken into account, even within those organs of 
international organisations which are in theory supposed to defend 
exclusively the interests of the organisation - as opposed to those organs 
which are composed of member states' delegates and whose function it is 
to represent the member states' interests ( such as the General Assembly in 
the UN, the General Council of the WTO, etc.). This is the reason why, for 
example within the EU, the scheme of the Treaty of Lisbon to reduce the 
size of the EU Commission ( which had grown larger with each territorial 
enlargement of the EU) in order to restore its efficiency, 117 had met such 
stiff opposition that it was given up. 118 
115 Weiss, 'International Bureaucracy', at 303. 
116 
See, e.g. Art. 101(3) UN Charter: 'The paramount consideration in the employment of the 
staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of having 
the highest standard of efficiency, competence, and integrity. Due regard shall be paid to the 
importance of recruiting staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible' ( emphasis added). 
The objective of these schemes is to prevent international organisations from becoming the 
monopoly of nationals from !arge, developed countries, and to secure the truly 'inter-
national' character of the staff. But if the staff were really independent and loyal only to the 
organisation, the nationality of the servants would not matter. 
117 
Art. 17(3) TEU: 'The members of the Commission shall be chosen from among the 
nationals of the Member States on the basis of a system of strictly equal rotation between 
the Member States, reflecting the demographic and geographical range of all the Member 
States.' The Comrnission is appointed by the Council in the formation of the heads of 
governments. 
118 
Conclusions of the Presidency of the European Council of 12 December 2008 (Doc. No. 
17271/08): '2. On the composition of the Commission, the European Council recalls 
that the Treaties currently in force require that the number of Commissioners be 
reduced in 2009. The European Council agrees that provided the Treaty of Lisbon 
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To conclude, geographically bound formal and informal election and 
appointment schemes for the staff of international organisations are a 
specific tool to manage the pervasive and specific conflict of interest in 
global governance, namely the conflict between national and inter-
national interests. 'The geographical quota tends to ensure that national 
interests continue to be an acceptable rationale for policies, both inside and 
outside the organisations: 119 Thereby, the organisation's interest and the 
member states' interests are supposed to be balanced;120 a subtle 'dialectic' 
between the nationality requirement and independence is effectuated by 
the geographic schemes. 121 
This balancing functions more or less weil, and has been severely 
criticised. Thomas Weiss has written that: 
[t]he overriding basis for action by an international civil service should 
be loyalty to the world community and to supranational perspectives. 
Ironically, the geographical quota system reinforces the acceptance and 
validity of national loyalties in the heart of international organisations, 
promoting precisely what international administration was theoretically 
erected to overcome. 122 
But the root of the problem that national interests - which are actually 
in the context of global governance 'alien' - take over 'is to be found 
not so much in corrupt individuals, but rather in the legal and political 
constraints under which the nationals of some member States operate 
in the Secretariat'. 123 This is a systemic problem of multi-level 
governance. 
10. The limits of the law 
In all three spheres of governance, the ever-denser conflict of interest 
regulation, which is seen as increasingly technical and arid, provokes the 
question of the limits of the law. Is conflict of interest really a legal 
question, or rather one of virtue? In public and global and corporate 
governance, this argument is typically formulated in terms of 
enters into force, a decision will be taken, in accordance with the necessary legal 
procedures, to the effect that the Commission shall continue to include one national of 
each Member State' (emphasis added). 
119 Weiss, 'International Bureaucracy', p. 293 (emphasis added). 
120 Haltern, Europarecht, p. 83 (with regard to the EU Commission). 
121 Lagrange, La representation institutionelle dans /'ordre international, p. 234. 
122 Weiss, 'International Bureaucracy', p. 303. 
123 Schreuer and Ebner, 'Art. 100', MN 74 (on the UN Secretary-General). 
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'integrity', 124 and in the professional sphere both in terms of 'integrity' 
and of 'professionalism'. Along this line, it has been asserted that 'pro-
fessionalism is the first, and primary, bulwark' against detrimental effects 
of conflict of interest. 125 
For example, legal provisions based on the concepts of good faith and 
loyalty cannot resolve problems of conflict of interest, when their premise, 
namely that managers are well-meaning persons who act with integrity, is 
wrong. In this regard, Lukas Handschin's findings 126 dovetail with Mon-
ika Roth's main argument127 that personal integrity (and the appropriate 
personnel choices, personnel training, and role models in top manage-
ment) matter most for successfully dealing with conflict of interest. But 
this is ultimately true for law in general. The operationality of legal rules 
depends to a large extent on shared societal (including ethical) attitudes. 
If this basis is lacking, the legal rules will remain a dead letter. 
So should conflict of interest be better managed within the framework 
of an (unenforceable) 'integrity-based ethics regime' (relying on aspir-
ation), rather than through an enforceable 'compliance-based regime' 
(relying on discipline and sanctions) - to use in the famous distinction 
established in the 1990s by the OECD?128 Probably, a combination is 
best. Along this line, the already mentioned study on conflict of interest 
of political office-holders recommends that emphasis be put on an 
integrity infrastructure which consists of a proactive approach towards 
conflict of interest (and ethics in general), including a combination of 
awareness raising instruments (including leadership ), transparency pol-
icies, rules and standards as weil as deterrent measures. 129 
124 See in this sense for global governance Urueiia, 'Conflict of interest in global govemance', 
Chapter 5 in this volume; for corporate and financial governance Roth, 'Conflict of interest: 
compliance and its contribution to corporate govemance in the financial services sector', 
Chapter 14 in this volume. See also OECD (note 14), p. 96: The proper objective of an 
effective conflict of interest policy is not the simple prohibition of all private capacity 
interests on the part of public officials, the immediate objective should be to maintain the 
integrity of official policy. In scholarship Warren, Administrative Law in the Political System, 
p. 183: '[Al person's inner attitudes toward govemance, not conflict-of-interest or other 
similar statutes, provide the best guidance for proper conduct.' 
125 Loewenstein, 'Commentary', p. 203. 
126 Handschin, 'Conflict of interest related to management and board payments - profit-
based remuneration systems make things worse', Chapter 16 in this volume. 
127 Roth, 'Conflict of interest', Chapter 14 in this volume. 
128 OECD, Public Management Service (PUMA), Managing government ethics, February 1997, 
available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/60/1899269.pdf (last accessed 15 December 2011). 
129 Demmke et al., Regulating Conflicts of Interest, p. 138. See for the same conclusion on 
integrity in the private, especially the financial sector Roth, 'Conflict of interest', 
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The suggestion to place more emphasis on 'integrity' and 'profession-
alism' seems all the more justified as existing hard conflict of interest 
rules are, anyway, notoriously difficult to enforce. It has even been stated 
that 'conflict-of-interest laws are virtually impossible to enforce' unless 
they are flagrantly violated. 130 Therefore, '[p]robably more important 
than having detailed conflict of interest regimes is to have a credible 
monitoring and control mechanism in place, the crucial issue being 
transparency and accessibility of information, monitoring and 
enforcement'. 131 
Moreover, sanctions can be divided into those targeting the 
acts resulting from tainted processes (by invalidation, vacation, etc.), 
and those targeting persons (removal from office, fines, etc.). The French 
Commission de reflexioris main finding is that targeting persons in a 
'deontological' fashion is more important than just targeting the acts.
132 
The suggestion to combine the legalist and the ethics approach is 
furthermore supported by the seemingly paradoxical fact that, typic-
ally, countries in which a high level of corruption exists ( or is perceived 
to exist) have denser and stricter conflict of interest rules than in 
countries with an entrenched integrity tradition. Is it not revealing 
that Article 43(1) of the relatively new Constitution of Madagascar 
states that public service shall neither be the source of illicit enrichment 
nor a means to serve private interests? 133 Such a straightforward and 
rather blunt constitutional prohibition of corruption would not be 
conceivable in a country like, say, Switzerland, because here the under-
lying norm is so deeply entrenched in culture that it goes without 
saying (even if it is of course not always observed). In fact, countries 
that are viewed as abiding the law very strictly, and in which a strong 
ethos of the public official exists ( such as Germany with its tradition of 
Chapter 14 in this volume. See for the necessity of a contextually adequate regulation, 
esp. taking into account the differences between industrial states and developing states 
Richter, 'Conflict of interest of heads of state', Chapter 13 in this volume. 
130 Warren, Administrative Law in the Political System, p. 183. 
131 Demmke et al., Regulating Conjlicts of Interest, p. 141. 
132 Commission de reflexion (note 13), p. 45. 
133 Art. 43 of the Constitution of Madagascar of 19 August 1992: '(l) No one called to carry 
out an office under this Constitution may accept presents or remuneration, except for 
his official salary, from any person or corporation domestic or foreign, under penalty of 
dismissal. (2) The application of these provisions shall be determined by law.' See also 
Richter, 'Conflict of interest of heads of state', Chapter 13 in this volume. 
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the Beamtentum), have - for example - practically no rules on restrict-
ing professional commitments after leaving public office. 134 
In parallel, in order to make up for the absence of a grown and time-
honoured culture of a non-national public service in the interest of inter-
national or supranational regimes (and because of the greater risk of 
succumbing to national interests), it might be expected that conflict of 
interest regulation in international organisations is denser and more expli-
cit than on the domestic plane. This is the case for the EU, where conflict of 
interest is regulated more denselywith regard to the EU institutions than in 
the EU member states themselves. 135 In contrast, conflict of interest regula-
tion on the global plane (for international organisations with a global 
scope) is still in its infancy, and attempts to harmonise it are only begin-
ning.136 It is submitted that tighter regulation of conflict of interest in 
global governance is in principle welcome, although, as Rene Uruefia points 
out, this might crowd out the expertise of the international civil servants 
which is in turn crucial for maintaining legitimacy. 137 
The empirical observation of dense regulation in spheres of 'low 
culture' confirms that regulation is normally a reaction to perceived 
deficiencies, and maybe even be inversely proportionate to the integrity 
and trust reigning vis-a-vis the public institutions. Where less trust 
exists, such as towards the relatively novel and far away European and 
global governance institutions, or in legal cultures which are less hostile 
vis-a-vis corruption, more regulation is called for ( often in the aftermath 
of scandals, accompanied by high media attention). 
But the question is whether this regulation in fact reaches the object-
ive of reducing the damaging effects of conflict of interest. There is little 
scientific knowledge about the effectiveness of the different regimes and 
· 138 Th . " . h h mstruments. eu eaect1veness seems to owe as muc tot e govern-
ance context (features such as transparency, accountability, proper 
134 Demmke et al., Regulating Conjlicts of Interest, p. 59, mentioning Germany, Denmark, 
Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden. 
135 Ibid., pp. 11 and 60. See for the EU regime in detail Peters, 'Cross-cutting problem of 
govemance', Chapter 1 in this volume, pp. 12-13. 
136 See Nganga Malonga, 'Conflict of interest of international civil servants', Chapter 4 in 
this volume; Peters, 'Cross-cutting problem of govemance', Chapter 1 in this volume, 
pp. 10-12. 
137 Uruefia, 'Conflict of interest in global governance', Chapter 5 in this volume. 
138 Demmke et al., Regulating Conjlicts of Interest, pp. 7-8 and 23. The authors urge that 
more concentration should be given to implementation issues. According to that study, 
the real challenges are to analyse how registers of interest are monitored, how post-
employment rules are enforced, and how ethics committees work in practice. 
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contracting, auditing and scrutiny and fairness) as to the sophistication 
of the conflict of interest law itself. 139 At this point, we seemingly come 
full circle: conflict of interest legislation is enacted in order to counteract 
the lack of an integrity culture, but seems to work only in t~e c~nte_xt of 
such a culture. However, such a culture needs a proper mst1tut10nal 
frame, and can be developed, inter alia, through the law itself. . 
It has been pointed out that existing rules appear to have httle 
deterrent effect because, due to the nature of the 'offence', conflicted 
agents typically underestimate the risk of being hel~ ~iable. They assess 
that future risk as being very small, but the probabihty of benefi.t (the 
. . 140 Th. b rewards of self-enrichment) as very high and near certam. 1s o ser-
vation again points to the fact that it is not in the first place _a cos~-
benefit calculus of gain versus sanctions which can lead to comphance m 
this field, but rather integrity (independent of sanctions). 
Finally, more regulation might in some instances be counterproduc-
tive, because the more rules there are, the more violations will occur. 
Media-driven scandalisation over such violations is no proof that con-
flict of interest is increasing as such. But it might foster the public 
Perception that holders of public office are less ethical than they were 
f . bl" t 141 before, and thus decrease, instead o mcrease pu 1c trus . 
11. Conflict of interest in governance: convergence 
or context-specifi.city? 
This book is designed to test the hypothesis that conflict of interest ~s 
a cross-cutting governance problem which concerns both the pubhc 
and the private sphere, and the local, national, and global level of 
governance. But does the phenomenon of conflict o~ interest a~d _the 
regulatory approaches to it really pose, if not identical then ~1mil_ar, 
problems which call for parallel respon_ses? If yes, _t~en the entire r~sk 
field of conflict of interest would mamfest a relativ1ty of the pubhc-
private divide, and a trend of transnationalisation of gove:nance (in 
the sense of eroding the boundaries between the domest1c and the 
international). 
139 Hine, 'Conclusion', p. 214. 
140 Issacharoff, 'Legal Responses to Conflict of Interest', p. 194. 
141 Demmke et al., Regulating Conflicts of Interest, p. 121. 
• 
MANAGING CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
11.1 A main challenge: blurriness of public and private 
lt has been stated that privatisation and private-public partnerships 
increase the likelihood of new forms of conflict of interest. 142 This is 
common knowledge in the context of nation states, and it has been weil 
researched how privatisations have transformed the administrations and 
the (formally) public service of states. What is less known and worth 
illustrating is the sirnilar phenomenon on the level of global governance. 
After the global political seismic shift of 1989, the United Nations started to 
undertake great efforts to cooperate with the private sector. A 2005 report 
of the Secretary-General heralded 'partnerships' between the United 
Nations and business as a novel policy instrument. 143 Such global pri-
vate-public partnerships are intended to contribute to the realisation of 
public functions. The report enumerates four functions of partnerships: to 
perform advocacy, to develop norms and standards, to share and coordin-
ate resources and expertise, and finally to harness markets for development. 
lt asks for a 'partnership mainstreaming' of the United Nations. Most 
importantly, the Secretary-General here presents the partnerships as a 
catalyst of institutional reform and innovation of the United Nations itself 
in the direction of a more outward-looking, more impact-oriented organ-
isation, as a stimulus for the diffusion of improved management practices 
and for enhancing a performance-based thinking. 144 This approach copies 
the administrative reforms that have been pursued within Western nation 
states since the 1980s under the label of 'new public management'. The price 
of more flexibility and more effectiveness-orientation may well be an 
increased potential for conflict of interest. 
This is exemplified by the ongoing quasi-privatisation of the World 
Health Organization.145 Public health is, generally speaking, an 
at-risk sector with regard to conflict of interest, because of the very high 
stakes (in terms of saving human lives and making money), and power-
ful pharmaceutical industries involved. Around 40 per cent of the WHO 
budget is nourished through private funding, with the Bill Gates 
142 Peters, 'Cross-cutting problem of governance', Chapter 1 in this volume, pp. 34-35. 
143 UN General Assembly 2005, Enhanced Cooperation Between the United Nations and All 
Relevant Partners, in Particular the Private Seetor. Report of the Secretary General (A/60/ 
214). The report gives numerous examples for partnerships between business actors and 
UN sub-organisations or programmes. The UNDP has a 'Partnership Bureau' with a 
'Private Seetor Division'. 
144 Ibid., paras. 32, 60, 62, 63. 
145 Mathari, 'Ungelöste Interessenkonflikte in der WHO', Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 25 May 
2011, 9. 
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Foundation being the second biggest voluntary contributor. Against this 
background, making that Foundation finance the external evaluation of 
the WHO performance created a conflict of interest. Another case in 
point was the WHO decision to classify the swine flu of 2009 as the 
highest risk level, which was suspected as having been tainted by conflict 
of interest. However, an independent expert investigation did not cor-
robate that suspicion.146 A third example for appearances of conflict of 
interest was the debate over the Swiss member of the WHO Executive 
Council Paul Herrling, who was a research director at the pharmaceut-
ical firm Novartis. He launched a WHO initiative on orphan diseases 
while he himself directed research projects for Novartis in this field. 
Finally, the WHO was heading for a substantial privatisation through the 
creation of a 'multi-stakeholder World Health Forum', composed of 
states, non-governmental organisations, private foundations and busi-
ness.147 This reform has been criticised by the NGO Medecins sans 
frontieres for 'institutionalising conflicts of interests as the norm within 
the WHO by extending the role of policy and decision shaping to for-
profit actors that have an interest in the outcome'. According to that 
NGO, the projected World Health Forum risked compromising and 
distorting internationally and nationally agreed public health priorities. 
'This is ever more worrying in the absence of a strong and clear WHO 
policy Oll conflicts of interests' wrote Medecins sans frontieres.
148 
The 
project was therefore abandoned. 
Overall, privatisation in a broad sense - comprising public-private 
partnerships, the new combinations of traditional 'bureaucratic' hier-
archy with 'horizontal' ('market-like') cooperation and collaboration, 
the use of private law to clothe institutions and processes, and outsour-
cing tasks and services - both on the domestic plane and in global 
governance, might alleviate mismanagement, ineffectiveness and lack 
of funding - but it bears risks. 
146 'WHO use of advisory bodies in responding to the influenza pandemic', Pandemie 
(HlNl) 2009 briefing note of 3 December 2009. 
147 See the WHO Director-General's report: 'The future of finandng for WHO: World 
Health Organization reforms for a healthy future', WHO Doc A64/4 of 5 May 2011, 
paras. 86-87. 
148 Medecins sans frontieres and Declaration de Berne join the Call to stop the World 
Health Forum, 17 May 2011, available at www.evb.ch/en/p25019347.html (last accessed 
15 December 2011). The projected reform has also been critisised by some governments 
as 'expropriating' the states which in the eyes of the critics should remain in the driving 
seat for reform. 
MANAGING CONFLICT OF INTEREST 411 
These new structures erode the public-private distinction. Moreover, 
that distinction is called into question by the existence of a third, societal, 
sphere. Civil society is neither 'public' in the sense of govemmental, nor 
'private' in the sense of self-interestedness and profit-making. Here as weil, 
conflict of interest can arise, i.e. with regard to decision-making by 
NGOs. 149 This is all the more relevant as NGOs are increasingly integrated 
in trilateral regulatory partnerships (public-private-societal) .150 Still it is 
controversial whether bribing employees or directors of not-for-profit 
entities as opposed to for-profit entities can constitute a crirninal offence.151 
This question has a high practical relevance, given the recurrent accusations 
of corruption ofhigh level representatives of sport associations such as the 
Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA). Again, this issue 
cuts across the domestic and the international level. 
To conclude, when government becomes privatised, and when 
decision-making becomes more collaborative (across regions, sectors, 
and forms of government), it becomes more likely that decision-makers 
will wear private and public hats simultaneously, and that commercial 
interests and public interests are hard to hold apart. All this bears the 
potential of novel variants of conflict of interest, and this indeed cuts 
across all spheres of governance. 
11.2 Similar regulatory responses 
A common rationale for combating conflict of interest: 
protecting trust 
Is there a similar rationale for combating conflict of interest in the various 
spheres? It is submitted that this common rationale is ensuring trust. That 
objective has been most clearly spelled out with regard to public officials. 
In the public sphere, public trust is the basis of the social contract and of 
democracy. Here, trust is also linked to the idea that holders of public and 
political office must be accountable to the citizens. 152 A loss of trust 
may in turn have detrimental economic effects, such as damaging the 
149 See MacDonald, McDonald and Norman, 'Charitable Conflicts of Interest' on conflict 
of interest in NGOs, more concretely on charities that raise funds for medical research. 
15° Cf. Peters et al. ( eds.), Non-state Actors as Standard Setters. 
151 See in favour of such an extension for Swiss criminal law Pieth, 'Korruption', para. 91. 
152 Cf. Art. 15 of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of 26 August 
1789: 'Society has the right to require of every public agent an account of his 
administration: 
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investment climate. 153 Concomitantly, the modern rationale for crimin-
alising bribery (in the public sector) is, in many jurisdictions, to protect 
the public's trust in the objectivity and rationality of the office-holders' 
· 154 act10n. 155 
Secondly, trust is paramount in global governance. Just as much, 
and maybe even more than their domestic counterpart~, the g~obal 
institutions depend on public faith. This includes the mternat10nal 
courts and tribunals, whose judges must 'inspire confidence in court 
h . d' . 1 11 ' 156 decisions and in t e JU 10a system more genera Y. 
But is the protection of trust also relevant in th_e corpor_ate sp_here? 
Here, the primordial regulatory objective of combatmg confhct of mte~-
est, including its criminal outgrowth, bribery, is ensuring ~air compet~-
tion among market participants. Firms should not obtam an unfair 
competitive advantage through bribing officials or t~e ~ersonne~ of 
private entities.157 But besides, markets for their funct10mng cruoally 
need trust and confidence ( of investors, of purchasers, of consumers, of 
clients). The paramount importance of trust in the corporate sector 
shines up in the term 'to entrust' to describe the handing over of 
resources to the management (the agent) by the shareholders (the 
principal). And confidence is a classic concern in th~ legal profession. 
For example, the Law Society of England and Wales 1mposes a b~an~et 
prohibition on solicitors from acting w~ere th~re is or m_ay ~e ,a s1?mfi-
cant risk of conflict of interest. The rat10nale 1s the S0c1ety s desire to 
maintain public confidence in the profession. Maintaining c~nfidence in 
the solicitor-client relationship is regarded as of paramount 1mportance. 
Clients should have confidence that the solicitor's partisanship is not 
compromised by his potentially conflicting responsibilities to others.'
158 
Finally, the more 'stakeholderism' gains ground in the corporate sector, 
153 Richter 'Conflict of interest of heads of state', Chapter 13 in this volume. 
154 In con;rast an older rationale for penalising passive bribery was the violation of the 
office-hold~r's duty ofloyalty towards the state. That idea could not justify the crimin-
alisation of active bribery and led to an asymmetry between both offences wh1ch has 
now been abandoned in many legal systems. Pieth, 'Korruption', para. 18. 
155 Nganga Malonga, 'International civil servants', Chapter 4 in this volume. 
156 Swigart, 'The National Judge', p. 223. . . . . 
157 For this reason, Switzerland, for example, has cod1fied pnvate bnbery m the code 
against unfair competitive practices, Art. 4a Lai federale du 19 decembre 1986 contre la 
concurrence deloyale (LCD), R.S. 241. 
158 Griffiths-Baker, Serving Two Masters, p. 164. 
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and the more corporate social responsibility is accepted, 159 the more the 
public 'trust' in corporate action is worth protecting as weil. 
Mixing command-and-control-regulation and 
market-based regulation 
lt has been asserted that the regulation of conflict of interest is and 
should be categorically different in areas of command-and-control-
regulation from those where market-based regulation occurs. In the 
classical duty-based paradigm, the office-holders adopt standards and 
enforce them. Office-holders are prone to experiencing a conflict 
between the 'public' and the 'private' interest. 
In contrast, in the paradigm of market-based regulation, the 
governing bodies do not impose standards, but create a framework in 
which market participants can meet. The standards then emerge from 
the meeting of offer and demand. To some extent, the market partici-
pants can be said to regulate themselves through that mechanism. The 
'governance' tool here is competition and market discipline. Along this 
line, a comprehensive study on the financial services sector has found 
that in investment banking, auditing, credit assessment, consulting by 
rating agencies, ' [ t J he market is often able to provide incentives that 
constrain conflicted agents, discounting the value of services when it 
perceived a conflict of interest is present'. 16° For example, clients who are 
concerned about conflict of interest of an auditor reduce the value they 
attach to the audit opinion. 'In response, financial service providers 
frequently institute safeguards to reduce the incentives to exploit con-
flicts, thereby protecting their reputation.' 161 
Crucially, in the paradigm of 'regulation' through the market, it is 
expected and indeed essential for each participant to actin his private interest 
for market regulatory mechanisms to work. In the words of Adam Smith: 
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, 
that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We 
address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never 
talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages. 162 
159 See on this aspect Peters, 'Cross-cutting problem of governance', Chapter 1 in this 
volume, pp. 16-17. 
16° Crockett et al., Confiicts of Interest in the Financial Services Industry, p. xix. 
161 Ibid. 
162 Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, book I, chapter ii, s. 2 
(emphasis added). 
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[E]very individual ... generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the 
public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it .. . : [H]e intends 
only his own gain, and he is in this . . . led by an mv1s1ble hand to 
promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it alw~ys t~e 
worse for the society that it was not part ofhis intention. By pursmng h1s 
own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually 
11 
. d , 163 than when he rea y mten s to promote 1t. 
In this classic formula, the 'public interest' is promoted unintentionally 
through the market participants' regard to their personal intere~t. Ideal-
typically, there is no confüct but on the contrary a convergen~e of mter~st. 
However, several chapters in this book showed that th1s theoretlcal 
model often does not work and that the assumed convergence of interest 
is incomplete or absent, for instance due to perverse incentives such as 
rewarding too risky decisions. 164 This means that a confl.ictual struc~ure of 
interests is ubiquitous, both in the person of office-holders or m the 
person of market participants who 'regulate' themselv~s. This also me~~s 
that the regulatory response should not categorically d1ffer. Moreover, 1t ~s 
far from clear in which issue areas duty-based ('command-and-control) 
regulation is appropriate, and where market-based regulation is best. 
It is a truism that in various markets, competition may not suffice to 
generate overall welfare and fairness, especially where the interests_ of 
some participants are both diffuse and of low overall value, where h~gh 
information costs make consumer choices difficult, and where high 
investment costs make the entry for rivals hard. Under such conditions 
it is unlikely that market mechanisms alone can protect certain partici-
pants and this applies also to the protection against obnoxious effects _of 
conflict of interest. 165 An area where this insight plays is the financial 
services market, where many clients depend on the services of one agent, 
· • 166 
and where a lack of transparency hampers compet1t10n. 
Finally, the regulatory choice (between command-and-control regula-
tion and market-based regulation) does and cannot depend on whether 
there is a public interest or not. More and more issues in the public 
interest, such as a clean environment and education, are being 
163 Ibid., book IV, chapter ii, s. 9 (emphasis added). 
164 See especially Handschin, 'Conflict of inter;st related to man~gement and .boar.d 
payments', Chapter 16 in this volume; Roth, Confhct of mterest, Chapter 14 m th1s 
volume. See also Peters, 'Cross-cutting problem of governance, Chapter 1 m th1s 
volume, pp. 23-25 on financial interests. 
165 Cf. Issacharoff, 'Legal Responses', p. 190. 
166 Palazzo and Rethel, 'Conflicts of Interest in Financial Intermediation', p. 20. 
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addressed through market-based regulation, for example through volun-
tary environmental agreements, emission certificate trading or school 
vouchers for parents. 
Transparency requirements 
b . 1· . 1 b 1167 d bl' 168 d . An o v1ous commona lty m g o a an pu 1c governance, an m 
regulation on the financial services (a 'private' industry) 169 is that 
transparency is the most popular remedy. Disclosure requirements have 
become the most important instrument in the field. It is no coincidence 
that the most powerful NGO in the global effort against corruption calls 
itself 'Transparency International'. 
But it also seems that the shortcomings of disclosure policies are visible 
in all three spheres of governance. First, the declaration as such does not 
in itself resolve the conflict but merely makes it visible. Disclosure would 
be sufficient if it led agents to marginalise the due interest. This is, 
however, not the case, especially because the decision-makers typically 
over-esteem their own reliability. 170 Secondly, disclosure obligations are 
often cumbersome and risk overflowing the clients or the public with 
irrelevant information. 171 Thirdly, disclosure can sometimes make 
matters worse, because - as it has been found for the accounting 
business - professionals may be more willing to give biased advice when 
they know that the person receiving the advice is aware of their conflict 
167 Within the UN, all staff members at the ASG level and above are since 1999 obliged to 
file financial disclosure statements in respect of themselves and their dependants (UN 
Staff Regulations of 7 February 2003 (Doc ST/SGB/2003/5), Art. I, Duties, obligations 
and privileges, Regulation 1.2 (n)). 
168 See for all holders of high public office, including parlamentarians, Demmke et al., 
Regulating Conflicts of Interest, p. 11. 
169 Thevenoz and Bahar, Conflict of Interest, p. 18: In the financial services area, disclosure 
has emerged as the favourite instrurnent of policy-makers, instead of a prohibition of 
acting in conflictual situations. Crockett et al., Conflicts of Interest in the Financial 
Services Industry, find this response adequate: '[T]he combination of market discipline, 
supplemented by mandatory disclosure of conflicts, and supervisory oversight are 
generally sufficient to contain the exploitation of conflicts of interest and the conse-
quent damage to the efficiency of the financial system ... Radical solutions to conflict of 
interest problerns that socialise information or stringently separate financial service 
activities are likely to do far more harm than good' (at p. xx). 
170 See supra p. 3 70 and Davis, 'Conflict of interest', p. 591. 
171 Office of Government Ethics, Report to Congress, Evaluating the Financial Disclosure 
Process for Employees of the Executive Branch and Recommending Improvements to it 
(Washington DC, March 2005) therefore recommends to reduce the number of valu-
ation categories, shortening some of the reporting time periods, raising the money 
threshold, and elirninating unnecessary data. 
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of interest. 172 Finally, the clients ( or the public) can do little to react on 
the disclosed information, if they have no real alternative. 173 lt is there-
fore on good grounds that the EU implementing Directive on Markets in 
Financial Instruments of 2006 succinctly states that 'over-reliance on 
disclosure without adequate consideration as to how conflicts may 
appropriately be managed is not permitted'. 174 
Pluralisation instead of neutralisation 
Although the concept of conflict of interest to some extent presupposes 
that the process of decision-making (in political and economic entities) 
should be 'clean' and rational from the beginning, a clinically isolated 
devotion to the office or profession, stripped of all interests, is not 
expected. On the contrary, many collective decision-making bodies, in 
all three spheres of governance, are often specifically composed of 
members who are supposed to represent various (societal or economic) 
interests. lt is submitted that this is a common and recommendable 
strategy to manage conflict of interest. 
In the public sphere, pluralisation is sought and could even be 
strengthened in parliaments, consultative expert committees, state 
governments and courts. For example, regulations, but more often 
unwritten rules and mere practices on the composition of higher courts 
foresee selection of candidates exactly on the basis of those members' 
affiliation to groups which are assumed to represent specific interests. 175 
The Swiss Government, a collective body, is composed of seven people. 
When electing the government members, parliament is held to see that 
the diverse (linguistic and cultural) regions of Switzerland are repre-
sented (Article 175( 4) of the Swiss Federal Constitution). In legislative 
bodies (parliaments), a guiding idea is that this body should be a more 
or less exact portrait, in miniature, of its constituency. This kind of 
descriptive representation is desired here on the assumption that the 
172 Moore et al., 'Conflict of Interest and the Case of Auditor Independence', p. 24. 
173 This has been stated with regard to the commercial sphere (Moore et al., 'Conflict of 
Interest and the Case of Auditor Independence', at 24) and for voters (Hine, 'Conclu-
sion', pp. 230-231). 
174 Directive 2006/73 of 10 August 2006 (OJ 2006 L 241/26), implementing MiFID, 
preamble para. 27. 
175 See for the value of diversity ( of nationality, language, cultural background, professional 
experience) on courts and the tension to the principle of the impartiality of judges 
Swigart, 'The National Judge'. 
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representative's characteristics are a guide to the actions he or she will 
take. Put differently, descriptive representation is sought because it 
presumably enhances the representation of diverse interests. In some 
parliaments, seats are reserved for women or minorities, in order to 
enhance such diversity. 176 Finally, bodies governing the media are typic-
ally required to reflect cultural diversity, and their membership is desig-
d d. 1 177 nate accor mg y. 
In the global sphere the search for pluralism permeates the set-up of 
the governing bodies and staff of international organisations. The 
recruitment of international civil servants respects geographical quotas. 
The bodies should be composed of nationals of different member states, 
so that the overall composition of the staff is a mix and truly 
international. 178 
In the private sphere, pluralism is sought in the board of directors 
and the executives of corporations in order to gather both expertise 
and interest representation. A well-balanced composition of the board 
is here considered to be an element of good corporate governance. 
For example, laws and codes of conduct in numerous jurisdictions 
require the board of directors of a shareholder company ( or the 
supervisory board) to be composed so as to ensure that all business 
expertise which the company needs is included. 179 This means that 
176 See for example Part XVI 'Special provisions relating to certain classes' of the Consti-
tution of India of 26 November 1949; in scholarship Peters and Suter, 'Representation, 
Discrimination, and Democracy'. 
177 See on the BBC: the Royal Charter of October 2006, Art. 14 (Trust members for 
the nations). The ordinary BBC trust members should represent the four nations, and 
' [ e] ach person to be designated under this article shall be suitably qualified by virtue of 
( a) his knowledge of the culture, characteristics and affairs of the people in the nation 
for which he is to be designated, and (b) his close touch with opinion in that nation.' 
Available at www.bbc.co. uk/bbctrust/ about/how _ we_govern/ charter_and _agreement 
(last accessed 15 December 2011). See, amongst the media laws ofthe various German 
Länder, the provisions on diverse membership of the boards, e.g. the Bayerisches 
Rundfunkgesetz (Art. 6(2)); the Norddeutscher Rundfunk Staatsvertrag, or the West-
deutsches Rundfunkgesetz ( § 15). 
178 See in detail pp. 401-404. 
179 Various codes on corporate governance contain recommendations on a well-balanced 
membership of the board of directors or supervisory board to that end. For example, 
the Swiss Code recommends that the board should be composed by members with 'experi-
ence and knowledge from different fields', and should also comprise 'members having 
long-standing international experience or members from abroad' (Art. II(b)(l2) of the 
Swiss Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance, adopted by economiesuisse, 
21 February 2008, available at www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/swiss_code_feb2008_en. 
pdf (last accessed 15 December 2011). See for the UK: Art. B(l) of the UK Corporate 
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persons who are linked to suppliers, customers, competitors or even 
employees will also be appointed to such a board. 
In all scenarios, and in all three spheres of governance, it is expected 
that the purposeful diversity will lead both to more informed decision-
making, to a reconciliation and partly even mutual cancellation of 
interests during the deliberations, and thus eventually to a balanced 
decision. Both the representivity and an acknowledged expertise of the 
decision-makers are particularly important for decisions whose out-
comes affect a culturally diverse public (for example in international 
settings ). 180 Excessive suspicion harboured vis-a-vis potentially undue 
interests, and strict regulation of any perceived conflict of interest might 
hamper pluralism. The solution lies in, it is submitted, the further 
'pluralisation' of decision-making bodies instead of their 'neutralisation'. 
Costs 
Besides the loss of expertise, 181 the following similar costs of strictly 
banning all conflict of interest arise in all spheres of governance. First of 
all, disclosure requirements are in tension with the protection of privacy. 
Secondly, as any other regulation, conflict of interest regulation to a 
certain extent hampers the functioning of the relevant markets or the 
institutions. 182 If conflict of interest rules require recusal, the proper and 
regular composition of the decision-making body is disrupted, and this also 
Govemance Code, available at www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/uk_cgc_june_20l0_en.pdf 
(last accessed 15 December 2011). See for Germany Art 5.4.1. ofthe Corporate Govemance 
Code, adopted by a govemment-appointed commission, current as of26 May 2010. For an 
overviewon the world's corporate govemance codes see www.ecgi.org/codes/all_codes.php 
(last accessed 15 December 2011). In some civil law countries, the law acknowledges 
different categories of company shares. Then, in some jurisdictions, the group ofholders 
of each category of shares has the power to appoint at least one board member. For 
Switzerland: Art. 709(1) Swiss Code of Obligations ( Code des Obligations). In Germany, 
such a power ofappointment can be foreseen in the articles ofthe company (§ 101(2) 
German Stock Companies Act (Aktiengesetz)). Moreover, German employees have a legal 
right to appoint a board member (Aufsichtsratsmitglied) (Mitbestimmungsgesetz of21 May 
1951; Betriebsverfassungsgesetz of 11 October 1952; Mitbestimmungsänderungsgesetz of 7 
August 1956). In France, such a power may be enshrined in the artides of the company 
under Arts. L 225-27 et seq. and L 225-79 of the French Code of Commerce ( Code de 
Commerce). See for the Societas Europaea (SE) Art. 4 ofthe EU Directive 2001/86/EC of8 
October 2001 (OJ 2001 L 294/22). 
180 This is the core of Uruefia's argument. See Uruefia, 'Conflict of interest in global 
governance', Chapter 5 in this volume. 
181 See pp. 393-399. 
182 For public governance Hine, 'Conclusion', p. 235; for the area of financial intermedation 
Palazzo and Rethel, 'Conflicts of Interest in Financial Intermediation', p. 19. 
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creates legal insecurity. With regard to the financial markets, it has been 
additionally pointed out that too intense regulation might stifle 
innovation. 183 
With regard to ( too) strict impartiality requirements on judges, it has 
been pointed out that not only the confidence which the courts must 
inspire is at stake, but on the other hand also the public interest in 
having a rational and smoothly operating judicial system. For example, 
the practical advantages of having a close network of local courts in 
which in a pre-trial stage judges act as investigators who in a later stage 
also sit as judges on the higher court might well outweigh the dangers for 
judicial impartiality going with this. 184 
Generally speaking, all mechanisms to identify and remove conflict of 
interest cost money. In the economic sphere, the compliance costs might 
disproportionately weigh on small firms. The heavy burden on them is all 
the more perverse as these firms are less exposed to conflict of interest. 
Finally, given the fact that conflict of interest arises in fiduciary 
relationships, an additional consideration is that the more this relation-
ship is burdened with direct (and costly) oversight and control, the less it 
makes sense for the principals to appoint an agent or trustee. From the 
perspective of the agent, too high compliance costs might deter persons 
from seeking such a position in the first place. 185 
11.3 The trend to diversity 
Empirically, if there is a common regulatory trend, it is the trend 
towards more diff erentiation. As countries develop a greater sensitivity 
toward conflict of interest in general, 'there is a greater awareness that 
catch-all legislation ... is likely to be a rather blunt instrument. There is 
thus a form of convergence in the search for appropriate forms of 
conflict-of-interest regulation across advanced democracies'. 186 But this 
regulation targeted at different types of office-holders and different sets 
of institutional relationships will not quickly lead to common patterns. 
With regard to public govemance, the currently most comprehensive 
study on conflict of interest concludes: 
183 
Issacharoff, 'Legal Responses', pp. 192-193. 
184 
ECHR, Fey v. Austria, appl. no. 14396/88, judgment of 24 February 1993, Ser. A No. 
255-A, concurring opinion Judge Martens, para. 4. 
185 
This is relevant both for public office (OECD (note 14), p. 96) and for the commercial 
sphere (Issacharoff, 'Legal Responses', pp. 189-90). 
186 Hine, 'Conclusion', p. 225. 
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[T]here is no ideal type of conflict of interest system: the need for different 
conflict of interest systems as weil as conditions for their success and 
failures depend to a large extent on the particular socio-cultural environ-
ment. Consequently, so-called 'high-trust' countries need different rules 
and standards than 'low-trust' countries with a high level of corruption.
187 
So conflict of interest regimes must be shaped to the needs of the specific 
administration, taking the particularities of the administrative culture 
and the political context into account. New policies should be developed 
in a manner that respects and reflects the culture of the country and the 
different institutions. There is no patent recipe for a perfect or correct 
code on conflict of interest, 188 and no general theory of conflict of 
. 1 . b d 189 mterest regu at10n can e rawn up. 
11.4 New regulatory frameworks 
Conflict of interest regulation is just one area in which the general debate 
on regulatory choice can and must be continued. As elsewhere, the basic 
argument in favour of state regulation is that this is the means to secure 
füll democratic legitimacy. On the other hand, the classic argument in 
favour of self-regulation are the principles of subsidiarity and propor-
tionality. Finally, the <langer of overregulation is all the more real as 
conflict of interest is situated in the grey zone between ethics and law. 
The question of regulatory design, whether sweeping general legal 
provisions on good faith and loyalty are sufficient or whether detailed 
rules on conflict of interest are preferable, is ultimately a question of 
assigning the job to the legislator or to the courts. Where merely general 
principles exist, problem-solving will be left to the judiciary. Again, this 
is not specific to conflict of interest regulation. 
Also, the necessity to steer a middle course between too broad rules 
(which are unlikely to incite a specific conduct), and too specific rules 
(which do not cover a broad array of constellations), between too 
flexible rules (which do not have a prohibitory value), and too rigid 
ones (which are unmanageable), is not a specific problem of conflict of 
interest, but a general regulatory challenge which plays in any social 
setting. Additional antagonist values and principles which the conflict of 
interest regulator must take into account are transparency versus priv-
acy, and trust versus control. 
187 Demmke et al., Regulating Conflicts of Interest, p. 138. 
189 Hine, 'Conclusion', pp. 213-215. 
188 Ibid., p. 9. 
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So is conflict of interest a suitable field for regulatory innovation, 
where new tools of governance, and 'smart' regulation could be tried? 
Clearly, the path of multi-level (local-national-regional-global) regula-
tion which is at the same time co-regulation (state and self-regulation) 
which has so far emerged, should be followed. International organisa-
tions could formulate broad objectives and allow for concrete and 
differentiated implementation in various states, complemented by self-
regulation of different economic sectors or entire industries. 
11.5 Conflict of interest and the common good 
The rise of the concept of conflict of interest, and the increasing percep-
tion that conflict of interest presents a problem which requires regula-
tion, manifests an Americanisation of the discourse and of regulatory 
approaches - given the fact that the term has been coined in the United 
States and that that country possesses the oldest and probably most 
sophisticated legislation on conflict of interest. 
Both the idea of conflict of interest itself, the perception of certain 
situations as a conflict, and its evaluation as a bad thing might be 
Western-centric. Is not the current climate of combating conflict of 
interest a 'Western' one? Do not the roots of the concept ( especially as 
applied to the public sphere) lie in the Western notions of individualism, 
citizenship and public interest (bonum commune)?190 The whole idea of 
conflict of interest rests on the implicit assumptions that decision-makers 
should pursue the 'general' ( or the corporation's, or the shareholders') 
interest. Can this idea be usefully applied to all types of governance, for 
instance to a neo-patrimonial state in Africa?191 I submit that it can, 
because - however defined and conceptualised - the search for the well-
being of a given community and for justice, is a universal or at least 
universalisable aspiration. The gist is that such a common good ( or 
equivalent idea) can, in pluralistic (national) societies, and all the more 
in the extremely pluralistic global sphere, anyway not be defined in a 
substantive manner. The bonum commune can therefore be attained only 
in an indirect way. In the end, thus, conflict of interest regulation is a 
procedural strategy to realise the common good. 
190 Hejka-Ekins, 'Conflict of Interest', p. 482. 
191 See Dobler, 'Private Vices, public benefits? Small-town bureaucratisation in Namibia', 
Chapter 12 in this volume. 
